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The legal landscape with respect to constructive discharges resulting from
sexually harassing conduct has been mired in confusion for the past two
decades. Courts generally have applied a multistep analysis that requires
plaintiffs to establish both the existence of severe or pervasive sexual
harassment, as well as additional aggravating factors warranting an
employee's resignation. The courts, however, have had a difficult time in
defining the contours of the separate harassment and constructive
discharge tests. The Supreme Court has weighed in on several occasions,
but rather than opt for clarity, the Court has created new tests and new
terminology that have compounded the confusion. The recent Pennsylvania
State Police v. Suders decision is a case in point. In that 2004 decision, the
Court ruled that an employer is strictly liable for harassment that results
from a supervisor's official act, but is subject to liability for other types of
supervisor harassment only if employer negligence is established. The
Court's use of the "official action" and "constructive discharge" concepts
in that case sets an unpredictable course and fails to correct the unfairness
of the current multitiered analytical framework.
This Article attempts to simplify and recalibrate the sexual
harassment/constructive discharge standard. We propose a Unitary
Constructive Discharge Standard that would provide a single mode of
analysis applicable to all claims of constructive discharge resulting from
workplace sexual harassment. The proposal merges elements of the current
strict liability and negligence tests and asks a single question: Did the
employer fail to redress sexual harassment of which it was or should have
been aware such that quitting was a fitting response for the employee
subjected to the harassment? The proposal jettisons two of the most unfair
elements of the current calculus, namely the requirement that the
harassment victim must always utilize formal complaint procedures and the
requirement in some circuits that an employee's resignation is actionable
only if the employer subjectively intended that result. While thereby
removing the necessity for employees to make out a case of "aggravated"
harassment in the constructive discharge context, the Unitary Standard
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nonetheless protects employer interests by ensuring that no liability will
ensue in the absence of causal fault attributed to an agent of the employer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nancy Drew Suders' claim of sexual harassment presented a common
scenario. Suders, who worked as a communications officer for the
Pennsylvania State Police, alleged that three of her supervisors subjected her
to a series of sexually-based harassing incidents. 1 Rather than file a formal
complaint under her employer's sexual harassment policy, Suders attempted
to resolve the situation informally by telling one of the supervisors to stop
making objectionable gestures.2 The harassing conduct, however, continued
to escalate. Suders eventually contacted the employer's equal opportunity
officer and reported the harassment. The officer told Suders to file a formal
complaint, but Suders found the officer to be "insensitive and unhelpful."3
Two days later, Suders quit her job after the supervisors trumped up a theft
charge and handcuffed Suders while at work.4 She subsequently filed suit
under Title VII alleging that she had been constructively discharged as a
result of the supervisors' sexual harassment.5
Suders' claim echoes a number of recurring themes prevalent in sexual
harassment jurisprudence. First, the alleged harassing behavior was
committed by supervisors. Given that employers entrust supervisors with
special authority in the workplace, it is not uncommon for supervisors to
misuse such authority either directly by inflicting harassment or indirectly by
failing to curb harassment engaged in by others. 6 Second, social science
research confirms that most victims of harassment do not invoke formal
complaint procedures, but instead attempt more informal methods of
mitigating harassing behavior.7 Third, even though employers are
encouraged by the prevailing legal standards to adopt sexual harassment
reporting systems, employers are in a better position, legally speaking, if they
1 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2347 (2004).
2 Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 437 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Pa. State
Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004).
3 Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2348.
4 Id.
51d.
6 See generally Ramona L. Paetzold, Supreme Court's 2003-04 Term Employment
Law Cases: Clarifying Aspects of Anti-Discrimination Law and ERISA, 8 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 195, 201-02 (2004).
7 See Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of
Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 312-17 (2001); Martha Chamallas, Title Vll's Midlife
Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 374-77 (2004).
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do not provide too much encouragement for employees to utilize those
systems. 8 Finally, very few sexual harassment victims initiate suit while they
still are employed. Far more common is a resignation coupled with a
subsequent claim of constructive discharge. 9
In spite of the recurring nature of situations similar to that experienced
by Suders, courts have had considerable difficulty in crafting a coherent
framework for analyzing the viability of constructive discharge claims
asserted in response to conduct that arguably constitutes hostile environment
sexual harassment. In 1986, the Supreme Court first recognized sexual
harassment as gender discrimination under Title VII.10 During the following
decade, confusion plagued lower courts, which generally required employees
to prove the elements of both a sexual harassment claim and a constructive
discharge claim; a confusion compounded by the two-fold nature of the
inquiry."1 On the one hand, the courts struggled to identify the essential
elements of actionable sexual harassment, with some courts focusing on the
extent of employer knowledge of the harassing conduct and others focusing
on whether the employer had adopted a visible sexual harassment grievance
procedure. 12 In addition, the circuit courts adopted widely diverging
standards for determining the existence of a constructive discharge.13
8 See David Sherwyn, Michael Heise, & Zev. J. Eigen, Don't Train Your Employees
and Cancel Your ".1-800" Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and
Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69
FORDHAM L. REv. 1265, 1293-94 (2001).
9 Beiner, supra note 7, at 317-23; Chamallas, supra note 7, at 310-11.
10 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986) (holding that hostile
work environment sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination actionable under
Title VII). In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court abstained from issuing
an employer liability standard, and instead, directed lower courts to use agency principles
when determining employer liability. Id. at 72.
11 See Sara Kagay, Note, Applying the Ellerth Defense to Constructive Discharge:
An Affirmative Answer, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1035, 1040-41 (2000).
12 See, e.g., Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assocs., 139 F.3d 532, 538-39 (5th
Cir. 1998) (failing to address complaint procedures, but holding that if an employee
complains of a hostile work environment, the employer may insulate itself from liability
by taking prompt action to remedy the discrimination); Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan
Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the "plaintiff must
prove that the employer either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of
the harassment but did nothing about it").
13 See generally Sarah H. Perry, Note, Enough is Enough: Per Se Constructive
Discharge for Victims of Sexually Hostile Work Environments Under Title VII, 70 WASH.
L. REv. 541, 546-50 (1995); Steven D. Underwood, Comment, Constructive Discharge
and the Employer's State of Mind: A Practical Standard, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 343,
344-56 (1998).
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In an effort to clarify employer liability standards, the Supreme Court in
two 1998 decisions developed a new test for sexual harassment grounded in a
new term: "tangible employment action."14 On the surface, the Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton decisions
appeared to provide a clear test: A court must hold an employer strictly liable
if a supervisor's harassment results in a tangible employment action which
effects a significant change in an employee's employment status. 15 If the
court does not find a tangible employment action, however, an employer can
escape liability by establishing an affirmative defense that shows that the
employer took reasonable measures to prevent and correct the harassment,
and that the employee unreasonably failed to use the preventative or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer.' 6
Instead of simplifying employer liability standards, however, the Ellerth
and Faragher decisions generated a circuit split over the meaning of what
constitutes a tangible employment action. In particular, lower courts
disagreed about whether a constructive discharge constitutes a tangible
employment action. 17 Lower courts also continued to disagree over the
appropriate standard for proving constructive discharge. 18
In a 2004 decision, Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, the Supreme
Court addressed the former issue and held that employers are strictly liable
when an employee quits in response to an adverse discriminatory action
14 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
15 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. According to the Court, "[a]
tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 524 U.S.
at 761 (emphasis added).
16 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The Court stated that "[t]he
defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 765.
17 The Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held that tangible employment
actions encompass constructive discharge, while the Second and Sixth Circuits have held
otherwise. See, e.g., Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 435 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub
nom. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004); Robinson v. Sappington, 351
F.3d 317, 336 (7th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 272 F.3d 1020, 1027 (8th
Cir. 2002); Turner v. Dowbrands, Inc., No. 99-3984, 2000 WL 924599, at *1 (6th Cir.
June 26, 2000); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294 (2d Cir.
1999).
18 See infra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
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officially changing her employment status or situation. 19 Absent an official
act, however, employers may assert the two-prong affirmative defense
described in the Ellerth and Faragher decisions. 20
The Suders decision, unfortunately, did little to clean up the muddle
surrounding the sexual harassment/constructive discharge inquiry. As
discussed below, the current array of standards governing this area are overly
complicated, unpredictable, and unfairly difficult for a harassed employee to
satisfy. While the Suders Court did provide a response to the question of
whether a constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action,
the official action test announced by the Court provides a fuzzy line of
demarcation that likely will spawn considerable litigation. 21 In addition, the
Suders decision failed to fix three continuing problems in the sexual
harassment/constructive discharge analysis. First, because most constructive
discharges do not result from an official act altering an employee's job status,
most employees cannot currently prevail if they have not filed a timely
formal report of harassment under their employer's sexual harassment
policy. 22 This application of the Ellerth and Faragher affirmative defense,
however, flies in the face of social science research which reveals that a
formal reporting requirement is an unrealistic touchstone for determining
sexual harassment liability.23 Second, as recent lower court cases have
demonstrated, the Suders decision has not eliminated the ongoing circuit split
with respect to the appropriate test for determining the existence of a
constructive discharge.24 Finally, Suders perpetuates the necessity for courts
to engage in a multistep inquiry to determine first, whether the conduct in
question constitutes sexual harassment and, secondly, whether the
harassment made the employee's working conditions so intolerable as to
make quitting a fitting response. The combination of requiring these separate
but overlapping inquiries results in a standard of liability that is more
onerous for constructive discharge claimants to establish than for other
victims of workplace harassment. 25
This Article addresses the shortcomings of the Suders decision and offers
an alternative standard aimed at streamlining the sexual
harassment/constructive discharge analysis. In Part II, the Article examines
the principal sources of the current confusion-namely the development of
19 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2355 (2004).
20 Id.
21 See Stephen F. Befort, The Labor and Employment Law Decisions of the Supreme
Court's 2003-04 Term, 20 LAB. LAW. 177, 186-87 (2004).
22 See generally Kagay, supra note 11, at 1056.
23 See infra notes 249-66 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 220-31 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 309-10 and accompanying text.
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separate, yet overlapping, tests for constructive discharge and Title VII
sexual harassment liability. Part HI describes the Court's attempt to clarify
the confusion in Suders and its ultimate failure to do so. Part IV then
proposes a revised and simplified sexual harassment/constructive discharge
mode of analysis. This Article proposes that courts adopt a Unitary
Constructive Discharge Standard applicable to all claims of constructive
discharge resulting from workplace sexual harassment, regardless of whether
perpetrated by a supervisor or by a co-worker. The proposal would work a
significant change in existing sexual harassment law by merging elements of
the current strict liability and negligence standards to impose liability
whenever an employer fails to redress harassment of which it was or should
have been aware such that quitting was a fitting response for the employee
subjected to the harassing conduct.
II. SOURCES OF CONFUSION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTRUCTIVE
DISCHARGE AND TITLE VII SEXUAL HARASSMENT STANDARDS
A. Constructive Discharge
The doctrine of constructive discharge first emerged as a tool for
employees to use under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). As courts
began applying the doctrine to other employment contexts, several different
constructive discharge standards developed.
1. Development of the Constructive Discharge Doctrine Under the
NLRA
Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935 as part of the New Deal to increase
employee rights in the workplace. 26 Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA explicitly
prohibits employers from engaging in certain unfair labor practices including
"discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization." 27 Employers violate § 8(a)(3) if they terminate an
employee because of an employee's support of or membership in a union.28
Soon after the passage of the NLRA, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) recognized that if it permitted employers to impose threatening
conditions to force an employee's resignation, the employers could indirectly
26 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000).
27 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
2 8 See ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATrHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 7.3 (2d ed. 2004).
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achieve what the NLRA forbids them from doing directly. 29 In response to
this possibility, the NLRB developed the constructive discharge doctrine to
ensure that the NLRA would protect employees from a broader range of
discriminatory conduct.30 In particular, the NLRB held that an employer
violates § 8(a)(3)'s antidiscrimination ban not only when it directly
terminates an employee, but also when it constructively discharges an
employee by purposefully creating intolerable working conditions. 31
Although the NLRB began applying the constructive discharge doctrine
in the 1930s, the appellate courts did not formally acknowledge the doctrine
for another decade. 32 In NLRB v. Waples-Platter Co., the Fifth Circuit
became the first federal court to recognize the term "constructive
discharge." 33 In that case, the court addressed allegations that the employer
had transferred two union organizers to different work locations in an attempt
to prevent union activity. 34 Although the NLRB found that the employer
constructively discharged the organizers, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding
29 Martin W. O'Toole, Note, Choosing a Standard for Constructive Discharge in
Title VII Litigation, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 587, 590 (1986); see also Cathy Shuck,
Comment, That's It, I Quit: Returning to First Principles in Constructive Discharge
Doctrine, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 401, 406 (2002).
30 See Roslyn C. Lieb, Constructive Discharge Under Section 8(a)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act: A Study in Undue Concern over Motives, 7 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 143, for a detailed history of constructive discharge under the NLRA. The NLRB
accepted the concept of constructive discharge as early as 1936. See In re Canvas Glove
Mfg. Works, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 519 (1936); see also Lieb, supra, at 146. Two years later
the NLRB invoked the term "constructive discharge" for the first time and ordered an
offending employer to reinstate four employees who had been coerced to quit because of
their union sympathies. See Sterling Corset Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 858 (1938); Lieb, supra, at
147.
31 The Supreme Court noted in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 894 (1984):
The Board, with the approval of lower courts, has long held that an employer
violates this provision not only when, for the purpose of discouraging union activity,
it directly dismisses an employee, but also when it purposefully creates working
conditions so intolerable that the employee has no option but to resign-a so-called
"constructive discharge."
Id. For other early NLRB cases explicitly accepting the constructive discharge doctrine,
see A. Sartorius & Co., 40 N.L.R.B. 107 (1942); Press Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 630 (1939),
enforced as modified by 118 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
32 Shuck, supra note 29, at 407-08; see NLRB v. Waples-Platter Co., 140 F.2d 228
(5th Cir. 1944). Following Waples-Platter Co., several other circuits also acknowledged
the constructive discharge doctrine, but none of them upheld an NLRB finding of
constructive discharge before 1953.
33 Waples-Platter Co., 140 F.2d at 230.
34 Waples-Platter Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 1156, 1174-75 (1943), enforced as modified by
140 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1944).
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that the employer transferred the employees to positions with equally good
working conditions, hours, and pay.35 A mere transfer or change in working
conditions, the court ruled, was not sufficient to constitute a constructive
discharge.
Following Waples-Platter Co., several other circuits also acknowledged
the constructive discharge doctrine, but none of them upheld an NLRB
finding of constructive discharge until 1953.36 In NLRB v. Saxe-Glassman
Shoe Corp., the First Circuit became the first federal circuit court to hold that
a § 8(a)(3) NLRA violation constituted a constructive discharge. 37 In that
case, one of the most ardent union advocates quit her job following several
union-related interrogations by her employer.38 The court found that the
employer constructively discharged the employee because she "was forced to
quit in the face of discriminatory treatment calculated to make her job
unbearable." 39 Significant to that case, the harassment was so severe that it
affected the employee's health.40 Courts' reluctance to uphold a constructive
discharge finding before Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp. suggests that the courts
did not want to hold employers liable without extreme discriminatory
conditions aimed at forcing an employee's resignation.
By the 1960s, most courts recognized that constructive discharge
constituted an NLRA violation.41 Like Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp., some
early NLRB constructive discharge cases involved intentional discriminatory
acts by an employer.42 In those cases, plaintiffs had to prove (a) that the
working conditions were so difficult or unpleasant as to force the employee
to resign, (b) that the employer intended to create those conditions because of
35 Waples-Platter Co., 140 F.2d at 230.
36 See, e.g., NLRB v. Russell Mfg. Co., 191 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1951); Progressive
Mine Workers of Am., Int'l Union v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1951); NLRB v.
Winona Knitting Mills, Inc., 163 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1947).
37 NLRB v. Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp., 201 F.2d 238, 244 (1st Cir. 1953).
38 Id. at 242-43.
39 Id. at 243. The First Circuit enforced the NLRB's order directing the employer to
make the employee whole for any loss of pay she suffered by reason of the employer's
discrimination. Id. at 244.
40 Id. at 243.
41 Shuck, supra note 29, at 408; see, e.g., NLRB v. Century Broad. Corp., 419 F.2d
771 (8th Cir. 1969); Retail Store Employees Union Local 880 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 329
(D.C. Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Vacuum Platers, Inc., 374 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1967); NLRB v.
Lipman Bros., Inc., 355 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Tenn. Packers, Inc., 339 F.2d
203 (6th Cir. 1964).
42 See, e.g., Tenn. Packers, Inc., 339 F.2d at 204 (supervisor directed others to
"make it as hard as possible" on the employee so that she would quit); Saxe-Glassman
Shoe Corp., 201 F.2d at 243 (employee "was forced to quit in the face of discriminatory
treatment calculated to make her job unbearable").
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the employee's union activities, and (c) that the employer intended to force
the employee to resign.43 Over time, however, the NLRB also adopted a
second approach to constructive discharge cases, one that did not oblige the
employee to offer direct proof of the employer's intent to cause the
employee's resignation. 44 Instead, the employee had to prove only that the
"employer imposed onerous working conditions on an employee it knew had
engaged in union activity, which it reasonably should have foreseen would
induce that employee to quit."'45
2. Constructive Discharge and Title VII: A Growing Welter of
Standards
Once the courts recognized the constructive discharge doctrine's crucial
role in NLRA enforcement, they began applying the doctrine to other
discrimination contexts as well.46 In applying the doctrine beyond the
NLRA, however, the courts developed several different standards for
determining the existence of a constructive discharge.
Initially, some courts continued to focus on intentional discrimination as
they first had when analyzing constructive discharge cases under the
NLRA. 47 For example, in Muller v. United States Steel Corp., the Tenth
Circuit implicitly adopted a specific intent standard for Title VII constructive
discharge claims. 48 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the employer's
failure to promote him constituted a violation of Title VII and that his
subsequent resignation constituted a constructive discharge. 49 The Tenth
Circuit disagreed and held that the employee failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish that the employer made a "deliberate effort to make
things difficult for the employee so as to bring about his separation." 50 Thus,
for the plaintiff s claim to have succeeded, he needed to present further proof
43 Crystal Princeton Ref. Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 1068, 1069 (1976); Underwood, supra
note 13, at 349.
44 See Keller Mfg. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 712, 723 (1978).
45 Id. (emphasis added). In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342,
2357-58 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting), Justice Thomas criticized the majority opinion
in part because its constructive discharge standard did not incorporate the NLRB intent
element. Justice Thomas, however, failed to recognize that the NLRB did not always
require that the employee prove that his employer intended to force his resignation. See
Keller Mfg. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. at 723.
46 See O'Toole, supra note 29, at 591; Underwood, supra note 13, at 346.
47 See, e.g., Muller v. U.S. Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1975).
48 See id. at 929.
49 Id. at 925-26.
50 Id. at 929.
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not only of discriminatory actions, but also that the employer's actions were
"designed to coerce his resignation. 51
Although the Tenth Circuit originally adopted a specific intent
standard,52 as other courts continued to analyze Title VII constructive
discharge claims, some shifted away from that standard.53 These courts
began requiring only that the plaintiff prove that the employer deliberately
engaged in discrimination without necessarily showing that the employer
also intended to force a resignation. 54 Some of these courts eventually
refocused their inquiry away from the question of employer intent and
toward the question of the reasonableness of the employee's resignation.55
For example, in Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing Co., the Fifth
Circuit explicitly rejected the specific intent requirement of Muller, and
urged courts to analyze the constructive discharge question from the
perspective of a reasonable employee, focusing on the imposed work
conditions rather than on the employer's state of mind.56
In the wake of Bourque, the circuit courts continued to split, resulting in
two competing constructive discharge standards: the "reasonable employee"
standard and the "employer intent" standard. 57 The "reasonable employee"
test requires that the employee demonstrate that her working conditions were
so intolerable that "a reasonable person in the employee's position would feel
compelled to resign." 58 In contrast, the "employer intent" standard requires
the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer specifically intended to compel
the employee's resignation in addition to satisfying the "reasonable
51 Id.
52 In Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986), the Tenth Circuit
rejected the specific intent standard that it used in Muller v. U.S. Steel Corp., 509 F.2d
923, 929 (10th Cir. 1975), and explicitly endorsed the objective reasonable employee
standard.
53 See Perry, supra note 13, at 548.
54 See, e.g., Calcote v. Tex. Educ. Found., Inc., 578 F.2d 95, 95 (5th Cir. 1978)
(involving allegations of racial pay discrimination and harassment); Young v. Sw. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1975) (involving allegations of religious
discrimination). Neither Calcote nor Young addressed the employer's state of mind;
instead, the Fifth Circuit focused on whether the employer deliberately imposed
intolerable conditions. See Calcote, 578 F.2d at 97-98; Young, 509 F.2d at 143-44.
55 See, e.g., Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Ci. 1980).
56 Id.
57 Perry, supra note 13, at 548; Shuck, supra note 29, at 413; Underwood, supra
note 13, at 349; see also Derr V. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 343 (10th Cir. 1986).
58 Derr, 796 F.2d at 344. The employer's subjective intent is irrelevant; instead,
"[the employer] must be held to have intended those consequences it could reasonably
have foreseen." Id. (quoting Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1175 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
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employee" test. 59 While a majority of the circuits adopted versions of the
reasonable employee standard, 60 the Second and Fourth Circuits continued to
require that employees prove that the employer specifically intended to
compel their resignation. 61
As the circuits continued to interpret the constructive discharge doctrine,
however, even those standards became muddled. For instance, in those
circuits that applied the reasonable employee test, some also imposed
additional requirements such as the duty to mitigate or the duty to notify the
employer of the intolerable conditions. 62 Other circuits required that the
employee prove that the employer knowingly permitted the intolerable
working conditions or otherwise deliberately made the working conditions
intolerable.63 The Sixth and Eighth Circuits now require proof that the
59 See Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 92 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 1996); Bristow v.
Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985). The "employer intent" standard
requires a plaintiff to prove two elements: "deliberateness of the employer's action, and
intolerability of the working conditions." Bristow, 770 F.2d at 1255. Deliberateness exists
if the plaintiff proves that the employer specifically intended to force the employee to
leave. Id. Courts assess intolerability of working conditions based on the "objective
standard of whether a 'reasonable person' in the employee's position would have felt
compelled to resign." Id.
60 See, e.g., Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000); Ramos
v. Davis & Geck, 167 F.3d 727, 732 (1st Cir. 1999); Lindale v. Tokheim Corp., 145 F.3d
953, 955 (7th Cir. 1998); Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1990); Spulak v.
K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1154 (10th Cir. 1990); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding
Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir. 1989).
61 See, e.g., Chertkova, 92 F.3d at 89; Bristow, 770 F.2d at 1255.
62 See, e.g., Gawley v. Ind. Univ., 276 F.3d 301, 315 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding no
constructive discharge despite the employee's informal efforts to protect herself because
she did not use the formal complaint procedure); Lindale v. Tokheim Corp., 145 F.3d
953, 955-56 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the standard of reasonableness imposes a
mitigation requirement on plaintiffs); Kilgore v. Thompson & Brock Mgmt., Inc., 93 F.3d
752, 754 (1 lth Cir. 1996) (suggesting that a reasonable employee must give the employer
sufficient time to remedy the situation); Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 805 (5th Cir.
1990) (holding that a reasonable employee would have completed the company's internal
grievance process or filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC)); Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 807 F.2d 1536, 1539 (1 1th Cir.
1987) (holding that, under the circumstances, a reasonable employee would have
complained to her store manager or filed an EEOC complaint before quitting). An
exception to the notice requirement may include instances in which an employee
correctly believes that her unlawful termination is imminent. See EEOC v. Univ. of Chi.
Hosps., 276 F.3d 326, 331-32 (7th Cir. 2002).
63 See, e.g., Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1558 (D.C. Cir.
1997) ("[A] 'finding of constructive discharge depends on whether the employer
deliberately made working conditions intolerable and drove the employee' out." (quoting
Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1981))); Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental
Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1084 (3d Cir. 1996) ("In order to establish a constructive discharge,
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employer specifically intended to force the employee's resignation, 64 but
have broadened the definition of "specific intent" to include situations in
which "quitting was a foreseeable consequence of the employer's actions. '65
As further indication of the confusion among the circuits, even the two
circuits that originally applied an employer intent requirement, the Second
and Fourth Circuits, recently have shifted away from this strict standard.66
The Second Circuit now requires that when a plaintiff cannot show specific
intent, she "must at least demonstrate that the employer's actions were
'deliberate' and not merely 'negligen[t] or ineffective[].,' ' 67 The Fourth
Circuit also relaxed its standard and now allows the plaintiff to prove that her
resignation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's
harassment. 68
With the development of these various standards, confusion plagues the
parties as well as the courts who are required to decide their cases.69
Plaintiffs do not have clear guidance as to what they need to prove to bring a
successful constructive discharge claim. Employees in similar circumstances
may have different chances of success depending on where they live.
Additionally, with so many competing standards, employers lack predictable
guidelines for determining how they should respond to workplace harassment
in order to avoid liability.
a plaintiff must show that 'the employer knowingly permitted conditions of
discrimination in employment so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them
would resign."') (quoting Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir.
1984)).
64 See, e.g., Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 382 F.3d 816, 829 (8th Cir. 2004);
Goldmeier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 629, 636 (6th Cir. 2003); Moore v. Kuka
Welding Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999); Hukkanen v. Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281, 284-85 (8th Cir. 1993).
65 Moore, 171 F.3d at 1080; see also Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285 ("Constructive
discharge plaintiffs thus satisfy [the] intent requirement by showing their resignation was
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of their employers' discriminatory actions.").
66 See Petrosino v. Bell At., 385 F.3d 210, 229-30 (2d Cir. 2004); Martin v.
Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1355 (4th Cir. 1995).
67 Petrosino, 385 F.3d at 230 (quoting Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialities, Inc.,
223 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2000)).
68 Martin, 48 F.3d at 1355.
69 See Shuck, supra note 29, at 424 (asserting that it is difficult to determine from
the circumstances of a case whether an employee's resignation is a reasonable response
to workplace harassment).
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B. Development of Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment Under
Title VII
1. The Early Years
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits employers
from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."70 The statute
does not explicitly prohibit sexual harassment and does not provide guidance
as to the meaning of the phrase "because of ... sex." Since Congress added
the prohibition against sex discrimination as a last minute amendment to
Title VII,71 little legislative history exists to guide courts in determining what
the ban on sex discrimination was intended to encompass. 72
Initially, courts did not recognize sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination under Title VII because they feared that they would be
inviting a flood of litigation against employers. 73 By the late 1970s, however,
the Third Circuit concluded that Title Vil's "congressional mandate that the
federal courts provide relief [for actionable sex discrimination] ... must not
be thwarted by concern for judicial economy." 74 Agreeing, the federal courts
generally began to recognize that sexual harassment was actionable where
the employer explicitly conditioned employment benefits on sexual favors or
punished employees who refused to comply with sexual demands.75 Courts
labeled this type of harassment as quid pro quo sexual harassment.
76
70 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
71 110 CONG. REc. 2577-2584 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964); see also Meritor Sav. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986).
72 Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64.
73 See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 557 (D.N.J.
1976) ("[If sexual harassment constituted sex discrimination under Title VH], no superior
could, prudently, attempt to open a social dialogue with any subordinate of either sex. An
invitation to dinner could become an invitation to a federal lawsuit if a once harmonious
relationship turned sour at some later time."), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Come
v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) ("[A]n outgrowth of
holding such activity to be actionable under Title VHl would be a potential federal lawsuit
every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances toward another."),
vacated by 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Kagay, supra note 11, at 1038; Jaimie
Leeser, Note, The Causal Role of Sex in Sexual Harassment, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1750,
1753-54 (2003).
74 Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1049 (3d Cir. 1977).
75 See, e.g., id. (holding that plaintiff stated a cause of action under Title VII when
she alleged that the defendant conditioned her continued employment upon submitting to
sexual advances by her supervisor); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989-90 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (holding that plaintiff stated a valid cause of action under Title VH when she
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In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court held that another
type of sexual harassment, hostile work environment harassment, is also
actionable under Title VII. 77 Hostile work environment harassment arises
when sexually demeaning behavior alters an employee's conditions or terms
of employment. 78 In Meritor Savings Bank, the plaintiff, Mechelle Vinson,
brought an action against her former employer, Meritor Savings Bank,
alleging that the bank's vice president sexually harassed her.79 According to
Vinson, the vice president repeatedly demanded sexual favors from her, and
she eventually acquiesced out of fear of losing her job. 80 Additionally,
Vinson alleged that the vice president fondled her in front of other
employees, followed her to the women's restroom, exposed himself to her,
and forcibly raped her on several occasions. 81 Vinson argued that these
unwelcome sexual advances created "an offensive or hostile working
environment" that violated Title VII, and the Court agreed. 82
The Court rejected the defendant's assertion that actionable
discrimination must cause a tangible, economic loss, 83 but also noted that
hostile environment claims only violate Title VII if the sexual harassment is
"sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment.' 84 The Court did
not, however, provide any further guidance as to how to determine when
harassment rises to the level of a hostile work environment. Additionally, the
Court declined to issue a definitive rule on employer liability for sexual
harassment claims, but instead directed lower courts to look to agency
alleged that her supervisor terminated her in retaliation for refusing his sexual advances).
Courts initially only focused on quid pro quo sexual harassment. Kagay, supra note 11, at
1039.
76 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1998).
77 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The Supreme Court explained
that the language of Title VII "evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment." Id. at 64 (quoting
City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
78 Id. at 64
79 Id. at 59-60.
80 Id. at 60.
81 Id.
82 Id. at64.
83 Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64.
84 ld. at 67 (citations omitted). The "severe or pervasive" harassment requirement is
specific to hostile work environment claims. When an employer explicitly threatens an
employee, thus establishing quid pro quo sexual harassment, the plaintiff does not need to
show "severe and pervasive" harassment. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
752 (1998).
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principles for guidance. 85 The Court noted that under Title VII, Congress
defined "employer" to include any "agent" of an employer, and thus intended
to limit the range of employee acts for which courts may hold employers
liable. As a result, lower courts should not hold employers automatically
liable when their supervisors sexually harass employees, but instead, should
impose liability only where the harassment stems from the supervisor's
agency relationship with the employer.86
Nevertheless, after Meritor Savings Bank, lower courts developed
employer responsibility standards according to the type of harassment at
issue rather than focusing on agency principles. 87 Where the plaintiff
established a quid pro quo claim, most federal courts held the employer
strictly liable regardless of whether the employer knew or should have
known about a supervisor's actions. 88 In hostile environment cases, on the
85 Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72. The Court agreed with the view of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that Congress intended agency principles
to form the basis for employer liability rules. Id. According to the EEOC, "where a
supervisor exercises the authority actually delegated to him by his employer, by making
or threatening to make decisions affecting the employment status of his subordinates,
such actions are properly imputed to the employer whose delegation of authority
empowered the supervisor to undertake them." Id. at 70 (citing Brief for United States
and the EEOC as Amici Curiae, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No.
84-1979).
86 Id. Where the supervisor acts outside of his delegated authority, or discriminates
in a way that does not affect his subordinates' employment, the supervisor is not an agent
of the employer, and courts should not hold the employer liable. See id.
87 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752-53; Susan Grover, After Ellerth: The Tangible
Employment Action in Sexual Harassment Analysis, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 809, 813-
14 (2002); Kagay, supra note 11, at 1040-41; Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical
Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLuM. J. GENDER & L. 197,
202-03 (2004).
88 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752-53; see, e.g., Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d
490, 495 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he standard for employer liability in cases of hostile-
environment sexual harassment by a supervisory employee is negligence, not strict
liability, and [the] liability for quid pro quo harassment is strict even if the supervisor's
threat does not result in a company act."); Davis v. Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1367 (8th
Cit. 1997) ("In the situation of quid pro quo sexual harassment by a supervisor, where the
harassment results in a tangible detriment to the subordinate employee, liability is
imputed to the employer."); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994)
("Because the quid pro quo harasser, by definition, wields the employer's authority to
alter the terms and conditions of employment-either actually or apparently-the law
imposes strict liability on the employer for quid pro quo harassment."); Bouton v. BMW
of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d
1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 1993); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th
Cir. 1992); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (1 th Cir. 1989).
2006]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
other hand, courts failed to articulate a clear liability standard, 89 evaluating
cases instead on a variety of factors. 90 The Tenth Circuit, for example, at one
time articulated a standard whereby an employer was liable for its
supervisor's sexual harassment if any of the following conditions was met:
(1) The supervisor committed the harassment while acting in the scope
of his employment.
(2) The employer knew about, or should have known about, the
harassment and failed to respond in a reasonable manner.
(3) If the employer manifested in the supervisor the authority to act on
its behalf, such manifestation resulted in harm to the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff acted or relied on the apparent authority in some way.
(4) If the employer delegated the authority to the supervisor to control
the plaintiffs work environment and the supervisor abused that delegated
authority by using that authority to aid or facilitate his perpetration of the
harassment. 9 1
Other courts limited their inquiries to the employer's knowledge of the
harassment or whether the employer had established an available grievance
procedure. 92 In response to the disarray of employer liability standards, the
89 See Davis, 115 F.3d at 1367 ("In the situation of quid pro quo sexual harassment
by a supervisor .... liability is imputed to the employer.... In situations ... alleging
hostile environment sexual harassment by a supervisor, however, the standard for
imputed liability is less clear."); Karibian, 14 F.3d at 779-80 ("A rule of employer
liability deriving from traditional agency principles cannot be reduced to a universal, pat
formula. It will certainly be relevant to the analysis, for example, that the alleged harasser
is the plaintiff's supervisor rather than her co-worker. Yet, even such a distinction will
not always be dispositive.") (citations omitted).
90 See Kagay, supra note 11, at 1041.
91 Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1446 (10th Cir. 1997), vacated, 524
U.S. 947 (1998) (citations omitted).
92 See, e.g., Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assocs., 139 F.3d 532, 538 (5th Cir.
1998) (holding that "an employer may insulate itself from Title VII liability by taking
prompt action to remedy the complaint"); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1398 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (holding that an employer may not be liable when the employer adopted policies in
such a way that "the victimized employee either knew or should have known that the
employer did not tolerate such conduct and that she could report it to the employer
without fear of adverse consequences"); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780
(2d Cir. 1994) (holding that "where a... supervisor does not rely on his supervisory
authority to carry out the harassment... the employer will not be liable unless 'the
employer either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment
but did nothing about it"') (quoting Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957
F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1992)).
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Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases that involved questions of
when liability for a supervisor's sexual harassment should be imputed to the
employer.
2. Faragher and Ellerth: Attempts to Clarify Employer Liability
Standards
On June 26, 1998, the Supreme Court decided companion cases
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton93 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.94
In its holdings, the Court differentiated between situations in which
employers are strictly liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment and those in
which the employer may invoke an affirmative defense to escape liability.
Despite the Court's attempt to create a consistent liability standard across
circuits, Faragher and Ellerth continued and added to the confusion.
a. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
Between 1985 and 1990, Beth Ann Faragher worked as an ocean
lifeguard for the city of Boca Raton, Florida.95 Faragher alleged that her
supervisors, Bill Terry and David Silverman, created a "sexually hostile
atmosphere" at the beach by repeatedly subjecting Faragher to offensive
touching, lewd remarks, and by speaking of women in offensive terms.96
Faragher recalled that Terry stated at one point that he would never promote
a woman to the rank of lieutenant and that Silverman once told Faragher to
"[d]ate me or clean the toilets for a year." 97
In February 1986, the City adopted a sexual harassment policy addressed
to all employees. 98 Four years later, the City revised the policy, but failed to
disseminate its policy among all employees. 99 As a result, Terry, Silverman,
and many lifeguards were unaware of the policy.'0° Faragher never
complained to higher management about Terry or Silverman, but she did
93 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
94 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
95 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 780. Faragher also alleged that Terry would repeatedly "put his arm around
Faragher with his hand on her buttocks.... and once commented disparagingly on
Faragher's shape." Id. at 782. Silverman apparently acted in similar ways by tackling
Faragher and remarking that he would have sexual relations with her if he did not find
one of her physical characteristics unattractive. Id. Both men also allegedly made similar
remarks to other female employees. Id.
98 Id. at 781-82.
99 Id. at 782.
100 Id.
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have informal discussions with Robert Gordon, another one of her immediate
supervisors. 1 1 Gordon failed to report Faragher's complaints to Terry, his
own supervisor, or any other city official. 10 2 In April 1990, a former
lifeguard wrote to the City's Personnel Director, "complaining that Terry and
Silverman had harassed her and other female lifeguards."'10 3 The City
investigated the complaint, found that Terry and Silverman had acted
inappropriately, and reprimanded them.104 Faragher resigned in June 1990
and later sued the City under Title VII for sexual harassment based on her
supervisors' conduct. 105
The district court held the City liable for Terry's and Silverman's
discriminatory harassment. 106 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the City was not liable for the
harassment despite the abusive work environment. 10 7 The full Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc, adopted the panel's findings. 108 The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in Faragher's favor. 109
b. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
From March 1993 until May 1994, Kimberly Ellerth worked as a
salesperson at Burlington Industries, at which point she quit, alleging that
one of her supervisors, Ted Slowik, constantly subjected her to sexual
harassment.11 0 Slowik was not Ellerth's immediate supervisor, but Ellerth' s
101 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 782-83.
102 Id. at 783.
103 Id.
104 Id. The City required Terry and Silverman to choose between a suspension
without pay or forfeiting annual leave. Id.
105 Id. at 780.
106 id. at 783. The district court found three justifications for holding the City liable:
(1) the harassment was pervasive enough that the City had knowledge or constructive
knowledge of it; (2) Terry and Silverman were acting as agents of the City when they
committed the acts; and (3) Gordon, a City supervisor, had knowledge of the harassment
but failed to act. Id.
107 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 783. The Eleventh Circuit panel ruled:
Terry and Silverman were not acting within the scope of their employment when
they engaged in the harassment, that they were not aided in their actions by the
agency relationship, and that the City had no constructive knowledge of the
harassment by virtue of its pervasiveness or Gordon's actual knowledge.
Id. at 784 (citations omitted).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 786.
110 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747 (1998).
[Vol. 67:593
WHEN QUITTING IS FITTNG
immediate supervisor reported to Slowik." l During one business trip, Slowik
allegedly invited Ellerth to the hotel lounge where he made remarks about
her breasts, told her to "loosen up" and warned her that he could make her
life "very hard or very easy at Burlington."'112 In another instance, Slowik
rubbed Ellerth's knees during a promotion interview and made comments
about Ellerth not being "loose enough.'113 Two months later Ellerth called
Slowik to ask permission to insert a customer's logo into a fabric sample. 114
He denied the request, and when Ellerth repeated the request a few days later,
Slowik asked, "are you wearing shorter skirts yet, Kim, because it would
make your job a whole heck of a lot easier."' 115 After Ellerth's immediate
supervisor reprimanded her regarding a work-related matter, Ellerth quit. 116
Three weeks later she sent a letter explaining that she quit because of
Slowik' s behavior.117
During her employment at Burlington, Ellerth knew that Burlington had
a policy against sexual harassment but failed to inform anyone about
Slowik's behavior.118 She chose not to notify her immediate supervisor
because she knew he would then have a duty to report the sexual harassment
incidents to Slowik. 119 On one occasion, Ellerth told Slowik directly that he
had made an inappropriate comment.120
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Burlington.121
The court found that Slowik's behavior was severe and pervasive enough to
create a hostile work environment, but that Burlington neither knew nor
should have known about the harassment.' 22 Sitting en banc, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, but failed to reach a consensus for
a controlling rationale. 123 The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's
decision, finding that summary judgment was not appropriate. 124
111 Id. at 747. Slowik was a midlevel manager and had authority to make hiring and
promotion decisions subject to the approval of his supervisor. Id.
112 Id. at 748.
113 Id.
114 Id.
1151Id.
116 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 749.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 749.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 766.
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c. The Holdings: New Standards for Employer Liability
Although the Supreme Court delivered two separate opinions, the Court
decided the cases concurrently, issuing the same holding for both. The Court
first addressed the bothersome distinction between quid pro quo and hostile
work environment cases. 125 The Court explained that while the terms are
helpful in determining whether the alleged violation consists of an explicit or
constructive alteration in employment status, 126 they do not, by themselves,
establish an employer liability standard for employment discrimination
purposes.127 Instead of using those terms as guides when determining
vicarious liability, the Ellerth Court directed courts to apply agency
principles in their analysis. 128
In its agency discussion, the Court addressed possible grounds for
imposing employer liability. 129 The Court recognized that "[n]egligence sets
a minimum standard for employer liability under Title VII.' 130 Under the
negligence standard, a court may hold an employer liable when the
employer's own negligence is the cause of the harassment. 131 For example,
an employer will be liable for the harassment caused by a co-worker or a
supervisor acting outside the scope of employment if the employer "knew or
125 Id. at 751. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
courts developed different employer liability standards for quid pro quo and hostile work
environment cases.
126 Employers violate Title VII when they either (a) explicitly alter the terms or
conditions of employment, or (b) constructively alter the terms and conditions by
imposing severe and pervasive sexual harassment on their employees. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at
752.
127 Id. The Court stated that the terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile work
environment" remain relevant when there is a threshold question about whether a plaintiff
can prove discrimination in violation of Title VII. Id. at 753.
128 Id. at 754. The Court addressed its agency discussion in Meritor and turned to
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957) for further discussion. Id. at 755. The
Court noted that an employer may be liable for the torts an employee commits within the
scope of his or her employment. Id. at 756. The Restatement articulates conduct within
the scope of employment when "'actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
[employer],' even if is forbidden by the employer." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 228(l)(c) (1957)). The Court also noted that "[i]n limited circumstances,
agency principles impose liability on employers even where employees commit torts
outside the scope of employment." Id. at 758. As an example, the Court stated that
employers may be vicariously liable when the employee "was aided in accomplishing the
tort by the existence of the agency relation." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1957)).
129 See id. at 758-59.
130 Id. at 759.
131 Id.
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should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it."1 32 The Court
then explained that although negligence may be a source of liability, the
plaintiff, Ellerth, had raised a different issue: whether the employer was
strictly liable for the harassment in question. 133
While dodging the issue of strict liability for co-worker harassment, 134
the Court turned its attention to supervisor harassment and held that
employers are vicariously liable where a supervisor with immediate authority
over the employee creates an actionable hostile environment resulting in a
"tangible employment action." 135  A "tangible employment action,"
according to the Court, is "a significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits."1 36
The Court rationalized imposing liability upon the employer by explaining
that a supervisor cannot make a tangible employment decision absent the
agency relation; therefore, "[tiangible employment actions are the means by
which the supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on
subordinates."' 37 Justifying its focus on supervisor harassment, the Court
noted that a tangible employment action usually inflicts direct economic
harm, the sort of injury that only a supervisor or another authority of the
company can impose. 138
132 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.
133 See id.
134 The Court noted that lower courts uniformly judge employer liability for co-
worker harassment under a negligence standard. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 799 (1998). Most circuit courts continue to apply a negligence standard for co-
worker harassment. See, e.g., McCombs v. Meijer, Inc., 395 F.3d 346, 353 (6th Cir.
2005); Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 976 (7th Cir. 2004); Joens v.
John Morrell & Co., 354 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 2004); Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc.,
335 F.3d 325, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2003); Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 401 (1st
Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 518 (6th Cir. 2001); Indest v.
Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1999); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11 (d) (2005) ("With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is
responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its
agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it
can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.").
135 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
136 Id. at 761.
137 Id. at 761-62.
138 Id. at 762. The Court noted:
Tangible employment actions fall within the special province of the supervisor. The
supervisor has been empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent to make
economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her control.
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Where the supervisor does not take a "tangible employment action"
against the employee, the employer may raise an affirmative defense to
liability or damages. 139 Under the affirmative defense, the employer must
prove both "that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior," and "that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise." 140 Although the Court intended to clarify employer liability
standards, it instead added to the confusion by creating another term,
"tangible employment action," for lower courts to interpret.
3. Circuit Split: Does "Tangible Employment Action" Include
Constructive Discharge?
Rather than simplifying the confusion surrounding the terms "quid pro
quo" and "hostile work environment," the Court facilitated a circuit split over
the meaning of "tangible employment action," specifically over whether the
definition encompasses constructive discharge. If constructive discharge is a
tangible employment action, employers do not have access to the Ellerth-
Faragher affirmative defenses, and courts then must hold employers strictly
liable for sexual harassment that induces employees to quit. 141 The Second 142
and Sixth 143 Circuits held that constructive discharges are not tangible
employment actions, while the Third,144 Seventh, 145 and Eighth 146 Circuits
held that they are. The First Circuit refused to follow either side of the circuit
split and held that courts should decide constructive discharge cases on a
Tangible employment actions are the means by which the supervisor brings the
official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates. A tangible employment
decision requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act.
Id.
139 Id. at 765.
140 Id. The Court held that the existence of an antiharassment policy would be an
important consideration for determining liability. Id. Additionally, an employee's failure
to complain would normally allow the employer to meet its burden under the second
element of the affirmative defense. Id.
141 Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 293-94 (2d Cir. 1999).
142 Id.
143 Turner v. Dowbrands, Inc., No. 99-3984, 2000 WL 924599, at *1 (6th Cir. June
26, 2000).
144 Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 448 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Pa. State
Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004).
145 Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317, 336 (7th Cir. 2003).
146 Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 272 F.3d 1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 2002).
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case-by-case basis.' 47 The two decisions discussed below illustrate the
diversity of opinion on this issue.
a. Second Circuit: Constructive Discharge Is Not a Tangible
Employment Action
In Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, the Second Circuit
became the first circuit to consider whether constructive discharge constitutes
a tangible employment action. 148 In that case, Veronica Caridad brought a
Title VII sexual harassment action against her former employer, Metro-North
Commuter Railroad (Metro-North).' 49 Caridad worked as an electrician at
Metro-North as the only woman in a thirteen-person shift. 150 She alleged that
for several months her supervisor sexually harassed her with unwanted
conduct including sexual touching. 151 Caridad also alleged that her male co-
workers treated her hostilely, telling Caridad that "nobody cares what
happens to you" and that "she walked into a lion's den."' 52 Despite the
availability of an employer-promulgated sexual harassment policy and
complaint procedures, Caridad initially failed to report the harassment.1 53
She eventually complained of being sexually harassed to Metro-North's
Director of Affirmative Action after the company confronted Caridad
concerning her absenteeism, but Caridad did not share the specifics of the
147 See Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys. Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2003). That court
explained:
Nothing is gained by arguing in the abstract about whether a constructive
discharge is or is not a discharge; for some purposes or rubrics, it might be so
treated, and for others not. What matters is the Supreme Court's rationale for
excluding tangible employment actions from the affirmative defense, namely, that a
supervisor who takes official action against an employee should be treated as acting
for the employer. There might indeed be cases in which official actions by the
supervisor--e.g., an extremely dangerous job assignment to retaliate for spumed
advances-could make employment intolerable ....
Id. (citations omitted).
148 See Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 293-94 (2d Cir.
1999).
149 Id. at 290. Caridad also involved a Title VII racial discrimination class action
lawsuit. Id. at 286. A group of present and former African American employees brought
an action against their employer, Metro-North, alleging that Metro-North's company-
wide discipline and promotion policies delegated substantial authority to department
supervisors that they exercised in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. at 286.
150 Id. at 290.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
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attacks. 154 Metro-North proposed to transfer her to another shift and also
offered her another position. 155 Caridad declined the offers because she did
not think that Metro-North's offers would solve her problems; she resigned
two months later.156 The district court dismissed Caridad's sexual harassment
claim on summary judgment, basing its decision on a finding that Caridad
had failed to utilize Metro-North's formal complaint procedures. 157 After
applying the Ellerth-Faragher framework, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment regarding the sexual
harassment claim.158
In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit held that constructive
discharge is not a tangible employment action under the Title VII sexual
harassment framework. 159 The Second Circuit emphasized the importance of
an agency relationship and argued that the Supreme Court only intended to
extend strict liability to employers where "an official act of the enterprise"
occurs. 160 Quoting Ellerth, the Second Circuit noted that "one co-
worker... cannot dock another's pay, nor can one co-worker demote
another .... The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a
distinct class of agent to make economic decisions affecting other employees
under his or her control."'161 Therefore, according to the court, a tangible
employment action may only result where a supervisor harasses an
employee, not where a co-worker is the harasser. 162 Because "[c]o-workers,
as well as supervisors, can cause the constructive discharge of an employee,"
the court declined to extend tangible employment actions to constructive
discharge. 163 Doing so, the court reasoned, would extend employer liability
154 Caridad, 191 F.3d at 290.
155 Id.
156 Id. Caridad argued that a job transfer would not resolve her harassment problems
because the other sites were also predominantly male. Id.
157 Id. at 290-91.
158 Id. at 296.
159 Id. at 294-95.
160 Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742, 762 (1998)).
161 Id. (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762). The court also noted that "unlike
demotion, discharge, or similar economic sanctions, an employee's constructive
discharge is not ratified or approved by the employer." Id.
162 See id.
163 Id. The court further explained: "[A]lthough we have stated in another context
that '[w]hen a c6nstructive discharge is found, an employee's resignation is treated ... as
if the employer had actually discharged the employee,' constructive discharge is not a
tangible employment action warranting the imposition of strict liability under the
EllerthlFaragher standard." Id. at 295 (quoting Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc. 831 F.2d
1184, 1188 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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to co-worker harassment cases and violate agency principles. 164 The court,
therefore, held that Metro-North was entitled to use the Ellerth-Faragher
affirmative defense. 165
b. Third Circuit: Constructive Discharge Is a Tangible Employment
Action
In Suders v. Easton, the Third Circuit responded to the Second Circuit's
co-worker concerns by concluding that the Supreme Court distinguished
between supervisors and co-workers in Ellerth and Faragher, and that strict
liability should attach only to supervisor harassment. 166 In Suders, the
plaintiff alleged that she suffered severe mistreatment and sexual harassment
from her supervisors while she worked as a police communications operator
with the Pennsylvania State Police (State Police). 167 Suders recounted several
instances of "name-calling, repeated episodes of explicit sexual gesturing,
obscene and offensive sexual conversations, and the posting of vulgar
images."' 168 For example, one supervisor repeatedly talked about people
having sex with animals and had discussions in front of Suders where he
stated that "if someone had a daughter, they should teach her how to give a
good blow job!"' 169 Another supervisor made obscene gestures towards
Suders, several times a night for five months, sometimes "grab[bing] hold of
his private parts and yell[ing], suck it.' 170
Suders confronted one of the defendants and asked him to stop, but she
did not report any of the incidents to others at the barracks. 171 Later, after her
supervisors accused Suders of misplacing a file and failing to complete an
assignment, Suders contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Officer for
the State Police, mentioning that her superiors were harassing her. 172 The
officer was "insensitive and unhelpful," and instructed Suders to file a
complaint without providing any assistance. 173 Ultimately, after the other
164 Id. at 294.
165 Id. at 296.
166 Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 450 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Pa. State
Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004).
167 Id. at 436.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 ld. at 437.
171 Id. at 438. As Suders explained, "there was no one on that station that I could go
to." Id.
172 Suders, 325 F.3d at 438, vacated sub nom. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct.
2342 (2004).
173 Id.
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officers later falsely accused Suders of theft and subsequently handcuffed,
photographed, and questioned her, Suders resigned from her position.174
Based on the lower court's findings of fact, the Third Circuit reversed the
lower court's summary judgment order. 175 The Third Circuit held that
genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on Suders'
claims of hostile work environment and constructive discharge. 176
Relying on the same agency principles that the Second Circuit had
discussed, the Third Circuit held that constructive discharge created by
supervisor harassment constitutes a tangible employment action. 177 The
Third Circuit opined that the Supreme Court intended the notion of a tangible
employment action to be a flexible concept because it provided a
nonexclusive definition of that term.178 Although the Supreme Court's
definition did not specifically reference constructive discharge, it did
reference firing. 179 Therefore, reasoned the Third Circuit, constructive
discharge is a tangible employment action because constructive discharge
"operates as the functional equivalent of an actual termination."' 180 When an
employee is constructively discharged, noted the court, that employee suffers
the identical economic harm that a formally discharged employee suffers. 181
Additionally, as a practical matter, the employer often ratifies the
constructive discharge because an employer will have some ability to
monitor the paperwork involved when an employee quits.i 82
The Third Circuit then dismissed the Second Circuit's concern about
expanding employer liability beyond supervisor constructive discharge. 183
The court explained that "for purposes of liability, only supervisors, because
174 Id. at 439.
175 Id. at 462.
176 Id.
177 Id. In Robinson v. Sappington, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Second Circuit's
supervisor/co-worker distinction and held that "it is appropriate to draw a distinction
between a constructive discharge caused by co-employees and a constructive discharge
caused by supervisors. Specifically, in circumstances where 'official actions by the
supervisor... make employment intolerable,' we believe a constructive discharge may
be considered a tangible employment action." Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317,
335-36 (7th Cir. 2003).
178 See Suders, 325 F.3d at 456, vacated sub nom. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124
S. Ct. 2342 (2004).
17 9 Id.
180 Id. at 458.
181 Id. (citing Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1075 (3d
Cir. 2003)).
182 Id. at 459 (citing Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490, 506 (7th
Cir. 1996) (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting)).
183 Id. at 457.
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of the authority vested in them by their employers and because of the rank
they possess over others, may be aided by the agency relation in the
commission of actionable harassment." 184 The Third Circuit explained that
"[iut is of no consequence that constructive discharge may be caused by a co-
worker because we are only concerned here with that which is caused by a
supervisor."' 185 The court further explained that "our inquiry is not whether
an action may be caused by a co-worker or supervisor, it is whether the
supervisor's action constitutes a 'significant change in employment
status."' 186
Although the two circuit courts disagreed as to the final outcome, both
agreed that they did not want to extend employer vicarious liability to
situations where co-worker harassment facilitates constructive discharge.
Thus, both circuits agreed that a constructive discharge may only be a
tangible employment action in cases where supervisor conduct triggered the
resignation.
III. PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE V. SUDERS: AN ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY
THE CONFUSION
On December 1, 2003, the United States Supreme Court granted a
petition for certiorari to the Third Circuit to decide the constructive discharge
issue in the Suders case. 187 The Court attempted to finally settle the
confusion surrounding constructive discharge standards and the definition of
a tangible employment action. Despite its good intentions, the Court once
again failed to resolve the confusion plaguing the sexual
harassment/constructive discharge arena.
A. The Holdings
In its decision, the Supreme Court held for the first time that Title VII
includes employer liability for constructive discharge. 188 Quoting Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Court reiterated its previous holding that to
184 See Suders, 325 F.3d at 450, vacated sub nom. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124
S. Ct. 2342 (2004). The court recognized that the agency relationship aids all harassment
in the sense that "most workplace harassment occurs because men and women are
brought together as co-workers in close quarters." Id. However, the court declined to
incorporate all workplace harassment under the agency relation standard because it did
not wish to hold employers vicariously liable for all co-worker harassment. Id. at 451
(citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998)). rp
185 Id. at 457.
186 Id. (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761).
187 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 803 (2003).
188 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2352 (2004).
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establish a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show harassing
behavior "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [their]
employment."' 189 To establish a constructive discharge, however, a plaintiff
alleging sexual harassment must make a further showing-she must
demonstrate that the hostile work environment became so intolerable that her
resignation qualified as "a fitting response."' 190 In recognizing constructive
discharge under Title VII, the Court reasoned that it already recognized
constructive discharge in the labor law context, 191 and that "Title VII is
violated by either explicit or constructive alterations in the terms or
conditions of employment.' 192 Applying constructive discharge to the Title
VII context, the Court concluded, was a logical extension of that doctrine.
The Court then addressed the tangible employment action debate,
reversing the Third Circuit's holding that the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative
defense is never available in constructive discharge cases. 193 The Court held
that an employer may assert the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense unless
the plaintiff quit in response to an adverse action officially changing her
employment status or situation. 194 Such an official action may include "a
humiliating demotion, extreme cut in pay, or transfer to a position in which
she would face unbearable working conditions."' 195 The Court affirmed the
agency principles that it articulated in Ellerth and Faragher, noting that
employers should be strictly liable only where the agency relation aids the
supervisor's misconduct. 196 "Absent... an official act, the extent to which
the supervisor's misconduct has been aided by the agency relation ... is less
certain."'197 That uncertainty, the Court argued, justifies allowing the
employer the opportunity to resort to the affirmative defense to avoid
vicarious liability. 198 The Court stated that depending on the circumstances,
courts should make available the affirmative defense for constructive
189 Id. at 2347 (alteration in original) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
190 Id.
191 Id. at 2352.
192 Id. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998)).
193 Id. at 2347, 2357. To assert a successful affirmative defense, an employer must
show both "(1) that it had installed a readily accessible and effective policy for reporting
and resolving complaints of sexual harassment, and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably
failed to avail herself of that employer-provided preventative or remedial apparatus." Id.
at 2347.
194 Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2355.
195 Id. at 2347.
196 See id. at 2353 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 801 (1998)).
197 Id. at 2355.
198 Id.
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discharge cases because "[u]nlike an actual termination, which is always
effected through an official act of the company, a constructive discharge
need not be."' 199 Sexual harassment rising to the level of a constructive
discharge may arise from co-worker conduct or unofficial supervisory
conduct, neither of which the Court found to comprise an official act. 200 The
Court then vacated the Third Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion.20 1
B. Good Intentions, Negative Effects
The Supreme Court undoubtedly wrote the Suders decision with good
intentions, but the decision will inevitably produce more uncertainty. On the
surface, the opinion appears well-grounded in policy considerations and
consistent with earlier Court decisions. The Suders standard builds on the
policy articulated in Ellerth and Faragher of only imposing strict liability
when a supervisor engages in some objective use of agency authority on
behalf of an employer. 20 2 When a supervisor's official action results in
harassment, the employer bears a greater degree of responsibility because it
has empowered its "agent to make economic decisions affecting other
employees under his or her control. '203 In addition, the employer in this
context has a greater ability to detect and prevent harassment because official
actions ordinarily are "documented in official company records,
and... subject to review by higher level supervisors." 204 In contrast, courts
will not hold employers strictly liable where they have little opportunity to
countermand the harassing behavior.
In addition to remaining true to agency principles, one could also argue
that the Suders decision adds clarity to the harassment debate by drawing a
bright line between supervisor and co-worker harassment. The Court
suggested that only supervisor harassment can be "effected through an
official act of the company," and therefore has the potential to be "aided by
the agency relation." 20 5 Regardless of whether this distinction is ultimately
appropriate, bright line distinctions give employers and lower courts notice
as to when strict liability is appropriate. Courts no longer have to fear, as the
Second Circuit once did, that they are extending employer liability too far by
199 Id.
200 Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2355.
201 Id. at 2357.
202 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998).
203 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
204 Id.
205 Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2355.
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holding employers liable every time a co-worker harasses another co-
worker.206
Despite the Suders decision's consistency with precedent and the
arguable clarity of the co-worker/supervisor distinction, the Suders decision
created two new imprecise terms that will likely spawn considerable
litigation: "official action" and "fitting response." Because the Court utilized
vague terms without providing much guidance to help decipher their
meanings, the Suders decision, like Ellerth and Faragher before it, likely
will create more confusion than it will resolve.
1. Official Action
In Suders, the Court held that employers are strictly liable for
constructive discharge cases caused by supervisor sexual harassment where
an official act underlies the constructive discharge.20 7 The Court, however,
gave little guidance to plaintiffs as to how they can prove that an official
action caused the constructive discharge. Unlike a traditional tangible
employment action such as a discharge or a demotion that is objectively
ascertainable, the question of whether an "official action" precipitated a
constructive discharge in a particular case entails a subjective assessment of
causation. This assessment may pose a difficult factual issue in many
circumstances. Take, for example, the situation of a male supervisor who
transfers a female employee to a previously all-male work team that is not
receptive to a female member. The co-workers engage in a pattern of
harassing behavior that makes the female employee's work life miserable.
After three or four months, the female employee resigns and asserts a hostile
work environment claim. The Suders opinion offers no guidance as to how to
assess whether this constructive discharge flows from the supervisor's
official transfer action or from the harassment perpetrated by the
nonsupervisory members of the work team. Perhaps the Court would want to
consider whether the supervisor knew that the team was not friendly to
females, or whether the transfer is also a promotion. Without further
guidance from the Court, these ideas are mere speculation. The causation
element in this example, as it will be in many other instances, simply is not
clear.
206 See Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294-95 (2d Cir.
1999); see also Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317, 335 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting the
common concerii among the circuits that "equating constructive discharge with other
types of tangible employment actions will impose liability on employers when the
offending employee has not been empowered by the employer to take the actions at
issue").
207 See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2355.
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Additionally, the Court gave little insight concerning the required causal
relationship between the sexual harassment and the official action. The
opinion suggests that employers will be liable where the sexual harassment
"culminates in a tangible employment action" such as where a supervisor
transfers an employee to an extremely dangerous job assignment in
retaliation for the employee's rebuffing the supervisor's advances. 20 8 The
Court, however, did not indicate whether an employer will also be liable
where an official action causes, but does not constitute, the sexual
harassment in question. 20 9 For example, the Court did not specify whether an
employer is strictly liable when a supervisor transfers an employee to a
different work environment that results in sexual harassment. Perhaps the
Court will hold the employer liable if the plaintiff can prove that the official
action caused the sexual harassment. The Court, however, did not adopt a
proximate cause or other causation standard, and, therefore, did not state how
strong the link between the official action and the sexual harassment must be.
Instead, the lower courts must make these decisions without guidance from
the Supreme Court.
2. Fitting Response
The lack of predictability in the "official action" analysis is aggravated
by another aspect of the Suders decision. The Court in Suders ruled for the
first time that a constructive discharge is actionable under Title VI.
2 10
Justice Ginsburg stated that to establish a constructive discharge, the plaintiff
"must show that the abusive working environment became so intolerable that
her resignation qualified as a fitting response."211 The opinion, however,
does not define "fitting response," and instead adopts the constructive
discharge doctrine without much discussion. 212 Further, the Court does not
208 See id. at 2352 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765
(1998)); see also id. at 2356 (adopting the rationale in Reed v. MBNA Marketing
Systems, Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2003)).
209 The Court merely said that the affirmative defense will not be available if the
"plaintiff quits in reasonable response to an employer-sanctioned adverse action officially
changing her employment status or situation." Id. at 2347. Additionally, the Court stated
that the Ellerth and Faragher decisions delineated "two categories of hostile work
environment claims: (1) harassment that 'culminates in a tangible employment action,'
for which employers are strictly liable, . . . and (2) harassment that takes place in the
absence of a tangible employment action, to which employers may assert an affirmative
defense .... Id. at 2352 (citations omitted). Neither of these categories includes
situations in which the tangible employment action culminates in harassment.
210 Id. at 2352.
211 Id. at 2347.
212 See id. at 2347, 2351-52.
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address the various standards that the circuits have adopted, but instead, only
references briefly the reasonable person standard, which it describes as
embodying an objective inquiry.213
Because the Court only mentioned the reasonable person standard, the
Suders opinion does not make explicit whether the Court intended the fitting
response standard to eliminate the requirement previously adopted by several
courts of showing that the employer intended to force the employee's
resignation. 214 The Court's failure to address this issue could be interpreted
in several ways. First, the Court may have unintentionally ignored the intent
requirement. This interpretation seems unlikely though because Justice
Thomas made the intent requirement an issue in his dissent. Justice Thomas
suggested that if courts want to "attach the same legal consequences to a
constructive discharge as to an actual discharge," a plaintiff should have to
prove that "his employer subjected him to an adverse employment action
with the specific intent of forcing the employee to quit. '215 Because Justice
Thomas squarely raised the intent issue, it is unlikely that the majority failed
to recognize the importance of this circuit-dividing issue.
A second option is that the Court did not address the intent issue because
it intended to adopt the constructive discharge concept under Title VII
without resolving the circuit split by setting a specific substantive
constructive discharge standard. In that case, lower courts could continue to
use their previously articulated standards. This interpretation is not likely,
however, as the Court easily could have said as much in the opinion, thus
avoiding any confusion.
Finally, the Court might have deliberately excluded the issue of
employer intent from its discussion because it intended to endorse the
reasonable person standard and did not want to incorporate an employer
intent requirement as part of the fitting response equation. This interpretation
seems most consistent with the Court's explicit reference to the reasonable
person standard and with its failure to address Justice Thomas's dissent
regarding the requirement of an employer intent element.216
213 See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2351. In explaining the history of the constructive
discharge doctrine, the Court noted: "Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an
employee's reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions is
assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial purposes.... The inquiry is objective: Did
working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's
position would have felt compelled to resign?" Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
See supra notes 58, 60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasonable
employee constructive discharge test.
214 See supra notes 47-51, 57-68 and accompanying text.
215 Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2358 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
216 See Christy M. Hanley, Comment and Casenote, A "Constructive" Compromise:
Using the Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Work Environment Classifications to Adjudicate
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The Court's lack of clarity on this issue is problematic on at least two
levels. First, it is not clear whether the Court has endorsed a particular
substantive constructive discharge standard. Such a result, of course, leaves
the lower courts in a state of uncertainty. Second, even if the Court's "fitting
response" pronouncement represents the adoption of a reasonable employee
standard, the Court's test is nonetheless problematic because it is a loose one
that provides little guidance for future outcomes. The Court did not provide
any indication, for example, of what is "fitting" or "reasonable" from the
perspective of either the employee or the employer. The lower courts already
have differing ideas of what duties, if any, a reasonable employee must
fulfill.217 In some circuits, a reasonable employee must attempt to mitigate
the harassment or notify her employer of the intolerable conditions, while
others suggest that a reasonable employee may quit without giving notice if
she believes her unlawful termination is imminent. 218 The Court did not
address any of these nuances of the reasonableness standard. The "fitting
response" benchmark also does not explain how intolerable the harassment
must be-the Court only stated that the plaintiff must establish hostile work
environment conditions plus "a further showing.., that the abusive working
environment became so intolerable that her resignation qualifies as a fitting
response." 219
Because the Court has not acted clearly, lower courts have issued various
interpretations, usually ones that allow them to continue applying the same
constructive discharge analysis that they used prior to the Suders decision.
For instance, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have continued to use the same
objective reasonable employee standard that they used before Suders.220
Those circuits have interpreted "fitting response" as the equivalent of a
reasonable employee inquiry, and therefore assess whether the working
conditions are so intolerable that a reasonable employee would have no other
choice but to quit.221 More surprising is that the Sixth and Eighth Circuits
Constructive Discharge Sexual Harassment Cases, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 259, 280 (2004)
(interpreting the majority opinion in Suders as "announc[ing] the objective standard for
analyzing a constructive discharge claim").
217 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
218 Id. (discussing the various versions of the reasonable employee test).
219 See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2347. Justice Thomas describes the majority's
constructive discharge standard as a "'hostile work environment plus' framework." Id. at
2358 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
220 Compare Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1990t and Spulak v. K
Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1154 (10th Cir. 1990), with Handy v. Brownlee, No. 04-
50545, 2004 WL 2980347, at *3 (5th Cir. Dec. 22, 2004), and Exum v. U.S. Olympic
Comm., 389 F.3d 1130, 1135-36 (10th Cir. 2004).
221 Handy, 2004 WL 2980347, at *3; Exum, 389 F.3d at 1135-36.
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also have continued to apply their pre-Suders standards.222 Although the
majority opinion in Suders never mentions employer intent as a component
of the constructive discharge calculus, those circuits continue to require that
plaintiff-employees show that their employers either specifically intended to
force their resignation or that their resignation was a foreseeable
consequence of their employers' actions.223 The Second Circuit also has
continued to require that plaintiffs establish that the employer intended to
force the employee's resignation, or at the very least, show that the
employer's adverse actions were deliberate. 224
A few courts in the Second Circuit have dismissed the apparent
inconsistency of requiring evidence of employer intent post-Suders, stating
that Suders did not negate the intent or deliberateness requirements.225
According to those courts, employer intent and an employee's fitting
response are elements of a two-part constructive discharge inquiry, with the
plaintiff bearing the burden of proof on both issues. For example, in
Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, the Second Circuit stated that a plaintiff first must
establish that the employer intended the conduct that led to the resignation by
showing either specific intent or deliberate actions.226 The plaintiff then must
show that the employer's actions rendered the working conditions so
intolerable as to compel resignation. 227 The court indicated that it assessed
intolerability based on whether a reasonable employee would have felt
compelled to resign under the circumstances. 228 In Collette v. Stein-Mart,
Inc., an unpublished Sixth Circuit opinion, the court adopted a similar
multiple-part inquiry.229 In that case, the court stated that a constructive
discharge analysis required an evaluation of (1) the employee's feelings and
whether they were objectively a "fitting response," (2) the employer's intent,
222 Compare Moore v. Kuka Welding Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999),
and Hukkanen v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281, 284-85 (8th Cir. 1993),
with Collette v. Stein-Mart, Inc., No. 03-2101, 2005 WL 293662, at *3-4 (6th Cir. Feb. 8,
2005), and Mennis v. Prime Hospitality Corp., No. Civ. 03-4191, 2004 WL 1987229, at
*9 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2004).
223 See, e.g., Collette, 2005 WL 293662, at *3-4; Mennis, 2004 WL 1987229, at *9.
224 See, e.g.,. Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 229-30 (2d Cir. 2004)
(requiring plaintiffs to show employer intent or deliberateness).
225 E.g., Thomas v. Bergdorf Goodman, Inc., No. 03-Civ.3066, 2004 WL 2979960,
at *9 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2004); EEOC v. Grief Bros. Co., No. 02-CV-468S, 2004
WL 2202641, at *15 n. 11 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,2004).
226 Petrosin-, 385 F.3d at 229-30.
227 Id. at 230.
228 Id.
229 Collette v. Stein-Mart, Inc., No. 03-2101, 2005 WL 293662, at *3-4 (6th Cir.
Feb. 8, 2005).
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and (3) the foreseeability of the conduct's impact on the employee. 230 These
multiple-part inquiries are surprising considering that Justice Thomas's
dissent criticized the majority in Suders for failing to adopt an intent or
deliberateness requirement. 231
In sum, the Court in Suders once again has failed to articulate clear
standards for determining employer liability for constructive discharge
sexual harassment cases. Before Suders, lower courts were split over the
meaning of "tangible employment action" and whether that term incorporates
constructive discharges. After Suders, courts continue to be uncertain as to
what constitutes a constructive discharge. Further, by creating new
ambiguous terms, "official action" and "fitting response," the Court not only
has failed to redress the ongoing confusion that afflicts the sexual
harassment/constructive discharge realm, but has created new areas of
unpredictability and the need for future litigation.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: STREAMLINING AND STANDARDIZING THE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT/CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE ANALYSIS
To bring predictability to the sexual harassment/constructive discharge
analysis, the Court should revisit Suders and adopt a standard whereby a
constructive discharge always involves an employer's official action. This
approach would combine the previously separate sexual harassment and
constructive discharge inquiries into a simplified unitary test that would
apply to all constructive discharge actions but not to situations that already
involve a tangible employment action such as "discharge, demotion, or
undesirable reassignment. ' 232 Under this new standard, the Unitary
Constructive Discharge Standard (the Unitary Standard), a plaintiff must
establish that the employer is at fault by directly or indirectly causing gender-
based intolerable working conditions. A plaintiff proves fault by showing
that the employer knew or should have known of the severe or pervasive
harassment, but failed to adequately respond to the conditions. If the plaintiff
succeeds in making that showing, the court will automatically hold the
employer liable and the employer will not have access to the Ellerth-
Faragher affirmative defense.
The Unitary Standard combines certain elements of the vicarious liability
approach and the employer-negligence standard into one unitary constructive
discharge rule that applies to supervisors and nonsupervisors alike. Similar to
a vicarious liability standard, once the plaintiff establishes that the employer
230 Id.
231 See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2358 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) for Justice Thomas's discussion of the specific intent standard.
232 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998).
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is at fault, the employer does not have an affirmative defense for its use. But
like the negligence standard, the plaintiff must prove that the employer knew
or should have known of the harassment, and failed to take appropriate
corrective action before liability may attach. As the Supreme Court stated in
Ellerth, "[niegligence sets a minimum standard for employer
liability .... ,,233 Uniting elements from both standards into one Unitary
Standard would streamline the courts' evaluation of sexual
harassment/constructive discharge cases. If courts adopt this standard, they
would no longer have to decide which constructive discharges involve
official actions or under what circumstances the employer may assert an
affirmative defense. Instead, all courts would apply one constructive
discharge standard to all sexual harassment cases, regardless of whether they
involved supervisor or nonsupervisor conduct. As a result, employers and
plaintiffs would receive predictable, fair, and equal treatment across the
circuits.
A. The Unitary Standard
Under the proposed Unitary Standard, plaintiffs may establish that their
constructive discharge was an official action by showing that the employer
directly or indirectly caused an intolerable environment of sexual
harassment. The Unitary Standard utilizes a two-pronged analysis. First, the
plaintiff must show that the employer knew or should have known of the
severe or pervasive harassment, and then she must prove that the employer
failed to adequately respond to the harassing conditions. Once a plaintiff
establishes these elements, the court must hold the employer liable regardless
of whether the harassment stemmed from supervisor or nonsupervisor
conduct.
1. Employer Knowledge
A plaintiff satisfies the first part of the Unitary Standard by showing that
the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment. An
employer has actual knowledge where an agent of the employer, such as an
officer, director or supervisory employee, becomes aware of the intolerable
conditions.234 To assess actual knowledge, a court may consider a variety of
factors including whether someone reported the misconduct to an agent of
the employer, or whether an agent made comments or took actions that
indicated actual knowledge. Additionally, a supervisor's overt action itself
233 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998).
234 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1999); Williamson v. City of Houston, 148 F.3d
462,464-67 (5th Cir. 1998).
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may demonstrate or establish actual knowledge. For example, when a
supervisor changes her employees' work schedules or transfers one or more
employees, those actions may be evidence of an attempt to alter intolerable
conditions, and therefore, demonstrate knowledge.
Alternatively, the plaintiff can show constructive knowledge by
establishing that the sexual harassment was so severe and pervasive that the
employer should have known of the harassment. 235 For example, the
harassment might reach such an intolerable level that an employer would not
know of the misconduct only if the employer was negligent or deliberately
ignored the circumstances surrounding the harassment. Accordingly, a
plaintiff could satisfy prong one of this standard by providing evidence of the
severity of the harassment and that a reasonable employer would be aware of
such conditions under the circumstances. Suppose, for instance, that a group
of male employees at a manufacturing plant routinely sexually assault new
female employees in the locker room. The supervisors have heard rumors
about the locker room conduct but do not have first-hand knowledge of the
assaults, and no one has directly complained to them. In hopes of avoiding
confrontation, the supervisors ignore the rumors and do not investigate.
Under these circumstances, plaintiffs would satisfy prong one of the Unitary
Standard. The supervisors did not have actual knowledge of the harassment
only because they ignored the circumstances surrounding the intolerable
conditions.
The knowledge standard is more flexible than many previously
articulated constructive discharge standards because it does not require
evidence of employer intent. The plaintiff would not have to prove the
employer's subjective state of mind other than to show that the employer had
actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment. The harassment then
becomes an official action when the employer permits the harassment to
continue by not providing an adequate remedy. 236 In contrast, several circuits
require that the plaintiff establish that the employer either intended to force
the employee's resignation or intended to create an intolerable work
235 See Stacey Dansky, Note, Eliminating Strict Liability in Quid Pro Quo Sexual
Harassment Cases, 76 TEx. L. REV. 435, 455 (1997) (stating that "the employer [is put]
on constructive notice when the harassment is blatant"); J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice
Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REv. 273, 317 (1995) (noting
that constructive notice occurs when the harassment took place "so openly and frequently
that the employer would be expected to have observed the conduct").
236 See Shuck, supra note 29, at 440 (arguing that a constructive discharge that
results from the employer's failure to correct harassing behavior should be deemed a
tangible employment action of that employer); Comment, First Circuit Holds That
Classification of Constructive Discharge as a Tangible Employment Action Should Be
Left to a Case-By-Case Determination, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1004, 1010 (2004) (same).
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atmosphere.2 37 These additional requirements are unnecessary because the
Unitary Standard already accounts for an analysis of the severity of sexual
harassment and the employer's knowledge of that harassment. If the
employer does not have actual or constructive knowledge of severe or
pervasive harassment, a finding of constructive discharge is not warranted.
But, if the employer is or should be aware of such harassment and does not
take appropriate remedial steps, then the employer should not escape liability
simply because it does not want or intend the employee to leave employment.
Some examples may help to illustrate this point. A harassing agent of the
employer may specifically want the victim to stay with the company so that
he can continue to harass the victim. Alternatively, the employer may be
aware of the harassment, not want it to continue, but fail to make any efforts
to stop it. The employer may think that addressing the harassment will
disrupt the workplace more than ignoring it would. The harasser, for
example, may be the employer's star performer who creates a majority of the
company's business. In that case, the employer may be reluctant to address
the harassment, especially when it knows that an appropriate response may
be to ask for the star performer's resignation. Finally, the employer may have
antiquated views of harassment and may not consider sexual harassment
discriminatory; instead, it may believe that any sexual conduct is a private
matter regardless of where it takes place. In all of these scenarios, the
employer has control over its work environment, but chooses to allow the
intolerable conditions to continue. In such circumstances, the employer
should not escape liability merely because it did not intend for the employee
to quit or for the harassment to continue. A knowledge standard, on the other
hand, appropriately deters these various situations in which the employer,
even if it did not intend for the discrimination to continue, nonetheless
directly or indirectly caused it to occur.
2. Adequate Response
Under the proposed Unitary Standard, once a plaintiff establishes
employer knowledge, she must next demonstrate that the employer failed to
respond adequately to the intolerable conditions. An adequate response is an
action or a set of actions that should be sufficient to stop the harassment.
238
Responding, by itself, should not excuse an employer from liability. If a
237 See supra notes 47-51, 59-68, 222-24 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the various intent standards.
238 See generally Glen Allen Staszewski, Note, Using Agency Principles for
Guidance in Finding Employer Liability for a Supervisor's Hostile Work Environment
Sexual Harassment, 48 VArND. L. REv. 1057, 1084-85 (1995) (discussing what actions
constitute an adequate response by the employer).
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supervisor has a long history of inappropriately touching his female
subordinates, the employer should not escape liability merely by issuing a
verbal warning when verbal warnings failed to alter the supervisor's behavior
in the past. The response must fit the situation.
Under exceptional circumstances, the employer may respond adequately,
but the harassment may not actually stop. For example, suppose a long-time
employee, Jim, began making inappropriate comments to his co-worker, Sue,
who worked in a neighboring cubicle. When Sue's supervisor learned of the
comments, she immediately transferred Jim to another building where he
would have no contact with Sue and no reason to enter Sue's building.
Suppose Jim entered Sue's building anyway and began stalking her outside
of the restroom that Sue usually used. If the employer had no reason to
believe that Jim was likely to escalate his behavior to this level, the
employer's response was adequate and no liability should attach to the
employer at this point. Such a result is appropriate because under normal
circumstances, the transfer should have remedied the situation. 239
3. Mitigation Requirement?
Under the majority reasonable employee constructive discharge standard,
several courts have imposed upon the employee a duty to mitigate or notify
the employer of the intolerable conditions. 240 In addition, the Ellerth-
Faragher affirmative defense includes the requirement that an employee
whose harassment does not result in a tangible employment action must "take
advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. '241 The proposed Unitary Standard
treats employee mitigation differently, imposing a variable requirement
depending on whether the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of
the harassment. When the plaintiff attempts to prove that the employer had
actual knowledge of the harassment, the plaintiff may use her mitigation
efforts as evidence of the employer's knowledge. The courts, however,
should not require the plaintiff to formally notify the employer in instances in
which the employer already has first-hand knowledge of the harassment,
such as by learning of it from someone other than the victim. An employee's
failure to use the employer's internal grievance procedures, sexual
harassment policies, or otherwise report the harassment to a specific person,
by itself, should not absolve the employer of liability in such circumstances.
The employer is in the best position to control the work environment and has
239 Of course, the employer is now responsible for responding to the newly escalated
situation once it is aware of it.
240 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
241 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
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a duty to ensure the safety of its workers in the workplace. If a duty to
mitigate is imposed upon the employee even when the employer had actual
knowledge of the harassment, the burden of maintaining workplace safety
would shift inappropriately from the employer to the employee.
In cases in which the employer only has constructive knowledge of the
harassment, however, the employee should have a duty to mitigate.
Requiring mitigation in this context will assist the employer in acquiring
sufficient information to take adequate measures in response to the
harassment. This mitigation duty, however, should not be construed as
requiring employees to use the employer's formal grievance procedures in all
instances. The proposed Unitary Standard only requires that the employee
"do something" to inform the employer of the harassment. "Doing
something" can involve talking to an immediate supervisor, a member of the
human resources department, or another agent of the company, or even
having another co-worker report the harassment on behalf of the victim. As
long as an agent of the employer is put on notice of the working conditions,
the employer has a duty to respond adequately. Courts should not penalize an
employee merely because the employee did not use a specific procedure
when the employer, in a practical sense, is in a position to remedy the
problem.
This mitigation requirement is far more flexible than the rigid reporting
requirement that has evolved under the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense.
Under the second prong of the affirmative defense, an employer may be able
to avoid liability for workplace harassment if it can establish "that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise." 242 Although the plain language used by the Court in Ellerth
would appear to enable a victim of harassment to defeat the affirmative
defense by making any type of reasonable effort to "avoid harm," the federal
courts essentially have rewritten the proviso to require the victim formally to
report the harassment in all instances. 243 A statistical analysis of published
federal court decisions issued after Ellerth and Faragher concludes that
"employees can almost guarantee a [summary judgment] victory for the
employer if they fail to report.' '244 The study found that "courts granted an
employer's motion for summary judgment in each of the twenty cases in
which employers satisfied the first prong [by adopting a sexual harassment
grievance policy] and the employee failed to report [by utilizing the formal
grievance policy]. '"245 Similarly, many federal courts have decided as a
242 Id.
243 Lawton, supra note 87, at 242; Sherwyn, supra note 8, at 1286, 1290.
244 Sherwyn, supra note 8, at 1286.
245 Id.; see also Lawton, supra note 87, at 243.
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matter of law that an employee's delay in reporting harassment is
unreasonable under the second prong of the affirmative defense, regardless of
the reason for such delay.246 Some courts also expect employees to use the
employer's formal grievance procedures even when the harasser is the
highest person of authority in a workplace or when the harassment is so
severe and pervasive that it has become a part of the workplace culture. 247 As
a result of these interpretations, the mandatory reporting requirement actually
enables workplace harassment by allowing employers to escape
responsibility even when a victim has legitimate reasons for not using official
procedures. 248
A more flexible mitigation requirement is consistent with the realities of
workplace harassment. Empirical studies consistently have shown that the
normal response of harassment victims is to not make a formal report of the
harassment. 249 These studies have found that only somewhere between two
percent on the low end and eighteen percent on the high end of employee
victims utilize formal grievance procedures. 250 The mandatory reporting
expectation of the affirmative defense, accordingly, distorts the realities of
social relationships at work by adopting a standard that few harassment
victims will satisfy.
One of the most common reasons that victims do not use official
reporting procedures is because they fear that reporting will make the
situation worse.251 Empirical research shows that some victims fear that
reporting will invite retaliation that would amplify the harassment and could
adversely affect their careers. 252 These fears may increase when the
employer's harassment policy requires the employee to report to the person
who is responsible for the harassment.253 Retaliation fears are not
unfounded. 254 One study found that employees who used official complaint
procedures had "significantly lower promotion rates and performance ratings
and significantly higher turnover rates" than those employees who did not
246 Sherwyn, supra note 8, at 1297-98; Lawton, supra note 87, at 253-54.
247 Chamallas, supra note 7, at 374.
248 Lawton, supra note 87, at 199 (noting also that the court's construction of the
Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense "improperly shift[s] the burden of proof on
reasonableness from the employer to the employee").
249 Chamallas, supra note 7, at 374; Lawton, supra note 87, at 208-09; Beiner,
supra note 7, at 312.
250 Chamallas, supra note 7, at 374.
251 Id. at 375; Lawton, supra note 87, at 257.
252 Chamallas, supra note 7, at 375; Lawton, supra note 87, at 257.
253 See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72-73 (1986) (addressing a
harassment case in which the employer's grievance procedure required the plaintiff to
complain first to her supervisor, the harassing vice president).
254 Chamallas, supra note 7, at 375-76; Lawton, supra note 87, at 258.
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use an employer grievance process.255 In a 1981 federal study, one-third of
employees who filed formal harassment complaints claimed that they
experienced retaliation. 256 A state study similarly reported that almost sixty-
two percent of employees who formally reported harassment experienced
retaliation. 257
Harassment reporters may experience other types of negative personal
impacts as well. For example, victims may develop Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder from exposure to sexual harassment and may be further traumatized
by engaging in a formal grievance procedure. 258 These grievance procedures
often require victims to recount and relive their experiences. 259 As a result,
an overwhelming majority of victims do not report the misconduct due to
privacy concerns and a fear that no one will believe them.260 Harassment
victims who do complain to employer agents frequently are humiliated by
being "laughed at, called slanderous liars, or considered 'fair game' for all
male employees." 261
Rather than use formal grievance systems to report harassment, victims
more frequently use informal alternatives in response to harassing
behavior.262 More than one-third of all harassment victims, for example,
respond in a manner similar to that of Nancy Drew Suders, 263 by asking the
harasser to correct the offending behavior.264 Other victims seek advice and
support by talking to colleagues at work.265 Still others defer filing formal
reports hoping that avoidance or making a joke of the matter will allow them
to cope with the situation. 266
255 David Lewin, Dispute Resolution in the Nonunion Firm: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 31 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 465, 498 (1987).
256 Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn't She Just Report Him? The Psychological
and Legal Implications of Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. IssUES
117, 122 (1995).
257 Id. Further evidence that employees perceive retaliation can be inferred from the
fact that employees often include retaliation charges with their sexual harassment claims.
Lawton, supra note 87, at 257.
258 Jennifer L. Vinciguerra, Note, The Present State of Sexual Harassment Law:
Perpetuating Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Sexually Harassed Women, 42 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 301, 328 (1994).
259 See id.
260 Chamallas, supra note 7, at 375; Vinciguerra, supra note 258, at 328 (noting a
1988 study that found that over 95% of victims do not complain).
261 Vinciguerra, supra note 258, at 328.
262 Chamallas, supra note 7, at 376-77.
263 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
264 Beiner, supra note 7, at 312.
265 Chamallas, supra note 7, at 376-77.
266 Beiner, supra note 7, at 312.
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The Unitary Standard attempts to reduce the burden on victims by
requiring only a more flexible mitigation requirement. Employees no longer
need to report the misconduct immediately, and when they do complain, they
may use unofficial channels to do so. These options, quite simply, are more
in tune with the realities of the workplace.
B. Constructive Discharge Under the Unitary Standard Always
Involves an Official Action
The proposed Unitary Standard treats all constructive discharges as
official employer actions. This is appropriate and consistent with legal
precedent for two reasons. First, a constructive discharge operates as the
functional equivalent of a formal discharge, a step which courts already
recognize as an official action. Second, under the Unitary Standard, a
resignation will only qualify as a constructive discharge when doing so does
not violate employer agency principles. These factors should alleviate any
concerns that the Unitary Standard would extend strict liability to situations
in which the employer is not at fault.
1. Constructive Discharges Are Functionally Equivalent to Formal
Discharges
The Supreme Court has consistently held that an employer is vicariously
liable for sexual harassment when the court finds that an official action was a
source of the discrimination. 267 In Ellerth, the Court used the term "tangible
employment action" and defined it as a "hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits."268 Because a "firing" is an official
action, courts also should be comfortable in treating a constructive discharge
as an official action.
The underlying premise of a constructive discharge is that it "operates as
the functional equivalent of a [formal] discharge. '269 Three characteristics of
constructive discharge support this conclusion. First, actual and constructive
discharges result in the same type of economic harm. 270 In Ellerth, the Court
held that an employer is vicariously liable when it commits a discriminatory
tangible employment action in part because those actions "constitute a
267 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2352-53 (2004); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
807 (1998).
268 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761 (emphasis added).
269 Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1075 (3d Cir. 1996).
270 See Chamallas, supra note 7, at 337-38.
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significant change in employment status" and "inflict direct economic
harm. '271 Both actual and constructive discharges satisfy these requirements
because in both instances, the employer's actions cause the employee's
involuntary job loss.27 2
Second, a constructive discharge is "legally, the employer's own
'deliberate act,"' 273 and therefore, it makes sense to attach the same legal
consequences to both actual and constructive discharges. The NLRB
originally developed the doctrine in response to situations in which
employers intimidated their employees into resigning to rid their workforce
of employees involved in union activities. 274 Courts applied the doctrine in
other contexts, including Title VII, to hold employers accountable where
they engaged in severe and pervasive discrimination that forced their
employees to quit.275 In essence, the NLRB and the courts used the doctrine
to prevent employers from achieving indirectly (discriminating by forcing a
resignation) what the statutes forbid them to do directly (discriminating by
firing) .276
Finally, constructive discharge warrants the same remedies as a
termination. Courts first began applying the constructive discharge doctrine
to the Title VII context so that they could assign the same legal consequences
to both types of job losses. The constructive discharge doctrine allowed
plaintiffs to recover monetary awards previously available only to someone
actually terminated.277 Originally, when an employer subjected an employee
to severe discrimination, that employee could obtain monetary relief under
Title VII only if she proved that the discrimination resulted in termination,
lower pay, denied promotions, or other economic detriment. 278 Title VII did
not provide her with a remedy if she quit in response to severe
discrimination. 279 As a result, plaintiffs turned to the constructive discharge
doctrine as a means of recovery, and courts began treating constructive and
271 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-62 ("A tangible employment action constitutes a
significant change in employment status .... A tangible employment action in most
cases inflicts direct economic harm.") (emphasis added).
272 See, e.g., Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1173 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
273 Id. at 1174.
274 See supra Part II.A. 1.
275 See supra Part II.A.2.
276 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
277 See Kagay, supra note 11, at 1047.
278 Callie Anderson Marks, Comment, Artful Dodger: Tenth Circuit Finds Hostile
Work Environment but No Constructive Discharge [Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79
F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1996)], 36 WASHBURN L.J. 152, 153 n.9 (1996).
279 Kagay, supra note 11, at 1047.
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actual discharge remedies similarly. 280 Courts now acknowledge that the
employer commits discriminatory acts equivalent to an actual discharge for
remedial purposes when an employer imposes conditions that force an
employee to resign.281
In his dissent in Suders, Justice Thomas argued that constructive
discharge has evolved away from its original form, to the point that it no
longer acts as the functional equivalent of a formal discharge.282 He stated
that "it makes sense to attach the same legal consequences to a constructive
discharge as to an actual discharge" if the constructive discharge doctrine
requires proof that the "employer subjected [the employee] to an adverse
employment action with the specific intent of forcing the employee to
quit."'283 He further argued, however, that "[tlhe Court has now adopted a
definition of constructive discharge ... that does not in the least resemble
actual discharge. '284 He then noted that the circuits have adopted a variety of
standards, the majority of which do not impose a specific intent or reasonable
foreseeability requirement.285 Justice Thomas seemed to fear that a standard
without an intent requirement would permit a finding of employer liability
without requiring an official company act.286
The Unitary Standard alleviates Justice Thomas's concerns by striking an
appropriate balance between employer and employee interests. Courts may
not find a constructive discharge under the Unitary Standard without first
concluding that the employer caused the intolerable working conditions. If an
employer does not have knowledge of workplace harassment or takes
appropriate steps to remedy severe and pervasive harassment, the employer is
not legally responsible for the conduct. If an employer fails to respond to the
280 Id.; Comment, supra note 236, at 1007-08; see, e.g., Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge,
Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1002 (10th Cir. 1996); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfr. Co., 617 F.2d 61,
65 (5th Cir. 1980). Originally under Title VII, the only remedies available for sexual
harassment claims were reinstatement, front pay, back pay, and injunctive and
declaratory relief. Perry, supra note 13, at 552 n.62. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
expanded relief to include punitive and compensatory damages for pain and suffering or
emotional distress. Id. at 552. Proving constructive discharge, however, still remains
essential to obtaining full recovery. Id. Plaintiffs may recover back pay and be reinstated
only if the employer actually or constructively discharges the employee. Id. Without
proving constructive discharge, a sexual harassment victim may only obtain a limited
amount of compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
281 See Kagay, supra note 11, at 1047; Comment, supra note 236, at 1010.
282 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2357-58 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
283 Id. at 2358.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 See id. at 2358-59.
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intolerable conditions adequately, however, the employer's actions in effect
endorse the conditions, and the constructive discharge functions, in practical
terms, as an official action of the employer.287 Accordingly, constructive
discharge under the Unitary Standard operates just as Justice Thomas
suggested it should: as the functional equivalent of an actual discharge.
2. The Unitary Standard Is Consistent with Agency Principles
The Unitary Standard also conforms to legal precedent because the
standard does not violate agency principles. Throughout Pennsylvania State
Police v. Suders; Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth; Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton; and Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Court repeatedly
stressed the importance of agency principles in determining employer
liability standards.288 As the Court held in Suders, employers should be
strictly liable only when the agency relation aids the misconduct.289 The
Court then required an official act before holding the employer strictly liable,
explaining that "[a]bsent... an official act, the extent to which the
supervisor's misconduct has been aided by the agency relation.., is less
certain."2 90 These agency principles ensure that courts hold employers liable
only in instances in which they are at fault and can control the work
environment. As a result, any new sexual harassment/constructive discharge
standard, at the very least, must remain consistent with these principles.
Thus far, courts have been unwilling to find strict liability for all
constructive discharges, because they have feared that doing so would extend
employer liability to situations in which the agency relation did not aid the
misconduct. For instance, in Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad,
the Second Circuit refused to find that constructive discharges are tangible
employment actions because it did not find that co-worker constructive
discharge involved misconduct aided by an agency relation. 291 The court
explained that employers empower supervisors, but not co-workers, to act as
agents of the employer; therefore, only supervisors can engage in "official
acts." Without an official action or other evidence of an agency relation, the
court was unwilling to hold employers strictly liable.
287 See Shuck, supra note 29, at 440 (arguing that a constructive discharge that
results due to the employer's failure to correct harassing behavior should be deemed a
tangible employment action of that employer); Comment, supra note 236, at 1010-11
(same).
288 Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2352-56; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
754 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 801-02 (1998); Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
289 Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2353, 2355.
290 Id. at 2355 (emphasis added).
291 Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294 (2d Cir. 1999).
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The Suders Court adopted a similar reasoning when it commented that
"[u]nlike an actual termination, which is always effected through an official
act of the company, a constructive discharge need not be." 292 According to
the Court, constructive discharges can arise from three situations: co-worker
conduct, unofficial supervisory conduct, or an official company act. 293 The
Court declined to extend automatic employer liability to all constructive
discharges because it argued that only an official company act sufficiently
incorporates agency principles. An "official company act," according to the
Court, must involve an adverse change of employment status or situation
because only then does the employer have the ability to monitor and change
adverse conditions.294
While the courts have valid concerns for limiting employer liability to
situations in which an official company act is involved, the Court's official
action definition is too restrictive and does not incorporate all situations in
which the employer empowers its employees to discriminate. Indeed, the
Suders Court did not rule that employer responsibility is limited to a
supervisor's official acts, but only that employer responsibility "is less
certain" beyond that particular context. 295  The Unitary Standard
appropriately adopts a more encompassing dividing line between those
constructive discharges aided by supervisor action or inaction on the one
hand, and other types of sexual harassment not caused or assisted by the
employer's agents on the other hand. The Unitary Standard, in short, expands
the "official act" definition to include all employer-caused constructive
discharges. Because employer fault must always be present in order to make
out a violation of the Unitary Standard, that test is consistent with agency
principles.
Under the Unitary Standard, a court should never impose liability on an
employer unless the employer has some control over the conduct in question
and is in a position to remedy the harassment. Contrary to the Court's
suggestion in Suders,296 an employer may be in this position in cases
involving what the Court labeled "co-worker" and "unofficial supervisory
conduct." For example, if a co-worker routinely harasses another employee
in the privacy of one of their homes, the employer has no control over the
292 Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2355.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Id. (emphasis added). The Court in Ellerth similarly acknowledged that a
supervisor's tangible employment action was not the exclusive realm of employer
responsibility, but simply "a class of cases where, beyond question, more than the mere
existence of the employment relation aids in commission of the harassment." Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998) (emphasis added).
296 See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2355.
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forum and should not bear any responsibility for the co-worker's actions. The
employer's responsibility changes, however, when the co-worker brings his
inappropriate behavior into the workplace, and the employer has knowledge
of it. In this instance, the employer has the power to remedy the situation
because the conditions exist in an environment that the employer controls.
The employer also has a duty to maintain a harassment-free workplace. If the
employer fails to act, the employer empowers the co-worker harasser to
continue harassing the victim and sends a message to its workforce that the
misconduct is acceptable.
For similar reasons, an employer should be liable when it knows or
should know that one of its supervisors is harassing an employee in the
workplace. The Court in Suders stated that supervisor harassment by itself
does not involve an official action because it "involve[s] no direct exercise of
company authority." 297 When, however, employer knowledge attaches to the
harassment, the employer directly exercises company authority. By allowing
known intolerable conditions to continue, the employer indirectly causes the
employee's resignation. As a result, a demotion or transfer need not attach to
the harassment to establish the degree of culpability that warrants a finding
of employer liability.
The Court uses agency principles as a guide to ensure that courts do not
hold employers liable for harassment that is not their fault. The Unitary
Standard does not violate these principles, because the standard only allows
courts to find a constructive discharge when the employer is at fault by
directly or indirectly causing the intolerable conditions. The Unitary
Standard protects employers that take appropriate steps to remedy the
harassment.
C. The Unitary Standard: Vicarious Liability, Negligence, or Neither?
As mentioned above, the proposed Unitary Standard incorporates
elements of both the vicarious liability and negligence standards. The Unitary
Standard, however, departs from both approaches to create a new employer
liability paradigm, one that redresses victims' injuries without holding
employers liable for workplace conduct which they could not control.
Consequently, it is inappropriate to categorize the Unitary Standard as either
a strict liability or negligence standard of liability. For example, despite the
Unitary Standard's resemblance to a vicarious liability standard, the Unitary
Standard draws on elements of the affirmative defense and, therefore, departs
from strict liability.298 Under the Unitary Standard, the plaintiff cannot
297 Id. at 2356 (quoting Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir.
2003)).
298 See supra note 16 for a description of the elements of the affirmative defense.
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establish employer fault without proving that the employer knew or should
have known of the sexually harassing behavior and failed adequately to
respond to such behavior. In some cases, the plaintiff also must show an
effort to mitigate. These elements bear a similarity to the Ellerth-Faragher
affirmative defense, 299 but they offer more flexibility. First, the employee
only needs to establish mitigation when the employer had constructive
knowledge of the harassment and not in cases in which the employer had
actual knowledge of the harassment. Additionally, the Unitary Standard only
requires the employee to "do something" to inform the employer of
workplace harassment. Rather than forfeiting all legal rights by failing to
follow strictly an employer's formal reporting procedures, the employee can
satisfy the mitigation requirement by taking such steps as may be practicable
to alert the employer to the existence of the harassment.
Eliminating the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense is also important
because the defense has created an almost insurmountable barrier for victims
of sexual harassment to overcome. Empirical studies have shown that
although employers have the burden of proof when raising the affirmative
defense, they have been overwhelmingly successful in establishing the
defense, especially at the summary judgment stage.300 Two patterns have
emerged. First, in determining whether "the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior," 30 1
lower courts typically find that an employer's implementation of a sexual
harassment policy by itself satisfies this first prong of the defense. 30 2
Additionally, as discussed above, employers often establish the second
element of the defense, that the "employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities," 30 3 whenever an
employee fails to use the policy's grievance mechanism to report harassment
immediately upon its occurrence. 3°4 In effect, the courts' interpretation of the
affirmative defense prevents plaintiffs from surviving summary judgment
unless they disprove the affirmative defense in addition to proving the
elements of their harassment claim.30 5 The Unitary Standard attempts to
299 A number of scholars have noted that the constructive discharge inquiry
duplicates certain elements of the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense. See Shari M.
Goldsmith, The Supreme Court's Suders Problem: Wrong Question, Wrong Facts
Determining Whether Constructive Discharge Is a Tangible Employment Action, 6 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 817, 836-39 (2004); Kagay, supra note 11, at 1059-60; Shuck, supra
note 29, at 444-45.
300 Chamallas, supra note 7, at 354.
301 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
302 Beiner, supra note 7, at 285; Sherwyn, supra note 8, at 1290.
303 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
304 See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
305 Lawton, supra note 87, at 199.
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reduce this inequitable burden by eliminating the affirmative defense and
providing a more flexible mitigation requirement.
Although the Unitary Standard also resembles the negligence standard
for employer liability, it departs from that standard as well. Courts have
applied the negligence standard to situations in which an employer
negligently responds to the harassment of a co-worker or a supervisor acting
outside the scope of employment. 306 Courts hold the employer liable under
the negligence standard when the employer knew or should have known of
the harassment but failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective
action.30 7 The Unitary Standard seeks to extend a similar analysis to all
harassment, regardless of whether it is perpetrated by a supervisor or a
nonsupervisory co-worker. But "negligence" is an inappropriate label for the
Unitary Standard because it addresses a range of employer culpability, from
situations in which the employer is negligent to cases where the employer
deliberately encourages the harassment or intends for it to continue. The
Unitary Standard will not, however, impose liability on an employer, unless
the employer is at fault for sexual harassment that causes an employee to
resign. In essence, the Unitary Standard incorporates elements of the
affirmative defense into its constructive discharge analysis, thereby
alleviating any concern that liability will extend to employers under
inappropriate circumstances. 308
Ultimately, the Unitary Standard's flexibility will provide a remedy to
harassed employees in a wider variety of situations in which an official
action is involved. The standard streamlines employer liability analysis
because courts only need to ask one question: Did the employer, by causing
or failing to correct known harassment, constructively discharge the
employee?
This simplification of the sexual harassment/constructive discharge
analysis comes with two particular advantages. First, the Unitary Standard
cuts through the Gordian Knot of confusion that has surrounded the sexual
harassment/constructive discharge arena for decades. The Unitary Standard
does away with the cumbersome, multistep analysis currently necessitated by
the separate, yet overlapping sexual harassment and constructive discharge
inquiries. Courts will no longer need to grapple with various constructive
discharge standards, decide if the particular situation involves an official
action, and then apply the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense if the answer
to that question is in the negative. The Unitary Standard, in short, replaces
306 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799
(1998); see also supra note 134 (listing examples of negligence standard cases).
307 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(d) (2005).
308 See infra notes 298-99 and accompanying text.
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the current confusion with a single test applicable to all constructive
discharges resulting from sexually harassing conduct.
The Unitary Standard also provides a more equitable substantive
standard for the sexual harassment/constructive discharge context. Under the
current analytical framework, a harassment victim bears a heavier burden to
establish a constructive discharge than do employees asserting other types of
harassment claims. 309 As the Supreme Court stated in Suders, a constructive
discharge claimant must establish "an aggravated case of sexual harassment"
by showing not only severe or pervasive harassment, but also that such
harassment reached such intolerable heights that quitting became a fitting
response.310 In many instances, the employee must also establish that the
employer intended that outcome and that the employee promptly reported the
harassment through formal channels. The Unitary Standard more equitably
lowers the substantive bar for constructive discharge claims to a level
commensurate with that of other types of sexual harassment claims. Further,
by requiring the employer to halt harassing behavior, however known, the
Unitary Standard best implements a policy of deterring and preventing
workplace harassment.
V. CONCLUSION
The legal landscape with respect to constructive discharges resulting
from sexually harassing conduct has been mired in confusion for the past two
decades. Courts generally have applied a multistep analysis that requires
plaintiffs to establish the existence of severe or pervasive sexual harassment
as well as additional aggravating factors warranting a constructive discharge
response. The courts, however, have trod a meandering path in attempting to
define the contours of the separate harassment and constructive discharge
tests. The Supreme Court has weighed in on several occasions, but rather
than opting for clarity, the Court has created new tests and new terminology
that have compounded the confusion. The Suders decision is a case in point.
The Court's use of the "official action" and "constructive discharge"
concepts sets an unpredictable course and fails to correct the unfairness of
the current multitiered analytical framework.
This Article attempts to simplify and recalibrate the sexual
harassment/constructive discharge standard. We propose a Unitary
Constructive Discharge Standard that would provide a single mode of
analysis applicable to all claims of constructive discharge resulting from
workplace sexual harassment. The proposal merges elements of the current
309 See Chamallas, supra note 7, at 315-16; Kagay, supra note 11, at 1048-50;
Perry, supra note 13, at 552-57.
310 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2354 (2004).
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strict liability and negligence tests and asks a single question: Did the
employer fail to redress sexual harassment of which it was or should have
been aware such that quitting was a fitting response for the employee
subjected to the harassment? The proposal jettisons two of the most unfair
elements of the current calculus, namely the requirement that the harassment
victim must always utilize formal complaint procedures and the requirement
in some circuits that harassment is actionable only if the employer
subjectively intended that result. While thereby removing the necessity for
employees to make out a case of "aggravated" harassment in the constructive
discharge context, the Unitary Standard nonetheless protects employer
interests by ensuring that no liability will ensue in the absence of causal fault
attributed to an agent of the employer. The result is a test that is both simpler
and more fair.
